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ABSTRACT

This thesis conducts an examination of the writing methods used by stand-up
comedians using the lens of the rhetorical canon of invention. The study applies the
theories of Thomas Rickert, Diane Davis, Ann Berthoff, and Janice Lauer in order to
define the relationship between humor and epistemology, and to consider how this
comedic-epistemic perspective can inform pedagogical practices in the composition
classroom. This study relies mainly on the rhetorical analysis of “How To…” books on
writing comedy, the methodologies of schools of comedy, as well as biographies
by/about comedians in order to discuss the relationship between comedians and their
“material.” The research also focuses primarily on stand-up comedy as a middle ground
between the organized chaos of improvisation and the written calcification of sketch
comedy. The findings of this research point to the productive capacity of laughter to
physically and epistemologically exceed our will to conceive of the world, and ourselves,
through a rational, controllable set of processes.
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CHAPTER ONE
EPIC FAIL: THE PROBLEM OF CYNICISM AND THE TASTY “NUGGET” OF THE
REAL

In many ways, how we define ideology becomes a key factor for how we are able to
argue for the function of rhetoric and composition in the lives of students. Ideology, as it
was considered in its earliest incarnations, was described as a form of “false consciousness,”
in which subjects cannot see (and/or seize) the opportunities for social or political change
that are in their best interests. Rhetoric, under this definition of ideology, functions as an aid
to the opposing, correct form of consciousness. One example would be in current-traditional
rhetoric where the role of rhetoric in the composition classroom is to support academic
discourse as “correct,” insofar as it is a neutral and objective way of describing reality
(Contemporary Composition 769). The argument for rhetoric then aligns with Richard
Lanham’s “weak defense” is his essay, “The Q Question,” wherein rhetoric is only an
ethical tool as long as it is dedicated to disrupting “false consciousness” and promotes what
has been established as universally good or true (155).
This view of ideology, at least in the minds of many scholars in rhetoric and
composition, has been supplanted by a more postmodern view of ideological dissemination.
There are dominant ideologies, which can be held by the majority and/or reinforced by the
state, but these ideologies are less implicated in a dichotomy of the true or false positions.
Göran Therbon, as quoted in James Berlin’s “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class,”
explains ideology as “’the constitution and patterning of how human beings live their lives
as conscious, reflecting initiators of acts in a structured, meaningful world. Ideology
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operates as discourse, addressing, or, as Altusser puts it, interpellating human beings as
subjects’” (479). Therbon’s description differs from the “false consciousness” definition in
two important ways. First, ideology is a given property of conscious thought, so that while
we can change from one ideological perspective to another, we can never get outside of
ideology.
The second important aspect of Therbon’s definition, and the reason for its
application via Berlin, is that it defines the expression of ideology within discourse.
Language is always ideological; it presents a viewpoint of reality in terms of what exists,
what is good, and what is possible. The composition classroom thus becomes a significant
location for helping students to understand the implications of ideology, but also must
necessarily take a more complicated stance toward ideology than in its previous definition
as a sort of “false consciousness.” Unlike the paradigm of current-traditional rhetoric,
pedagogy that considers ideology to be a part of any “meaningful world” lacks a claim to
any objective ideological position from which to discount another ideological position as
false. The question becomes: How can the composition classroom function as a place for
students to realize both their ideological construction and their agency within that
construction, instead of simply reifying the strength of the students’ already fortified
ideological positions?
To this end, James Berlin developed the idea of social-epistemic rhetoric, a model of
rhetoric which is still central to cultural studies pedagogy today. Social-epistemic rhetoric,
to some extent, aims to take on the admirable task of accepting the ever-present nature of
ideology by accepting that the, “…perceiving subject, the discourse communities to which
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the subject is part, and the material world itself are all the constructions of a historical
discourse, of the ideological formulations inscribed in the language-mediated practical
activity of a particular time and place” (489). Berlin is careful to separate this perspective
from mere relativism, however, claiming that, through a social-epistemic rhetoric, each
ideological perspective must be interrogated for the kinds of persons, ideas, and actions that
it privileges, as well as for those that it disregards. Human actions, Berlin claims, “…are
always already interpretations that must be constantly revised in the interests of greater
participation for all, for the greater good of all” (490).
This criticism also follows for students to criticize their own ideological
construction, actively acknowledging the way their discourse empowers certain forms of
knowledge or subjectivity over others. Through understanding the ways that their
subjectivity is constructed out of social and historical factors, the logic goes, the students
will understand their constructed-ness as something which can and should actively be
changed over time (491). This ideal student subjectivity, one that understands their own
ideology as inescapably partial but also effectively malleable, is considered to be liberated
from the threat of reified ideological thinking, and is the ultimate goal of social-epistemic
rhetoric. Indeed, Berlin has stated that “To succeed at anything else is no success at all”
(492).
Berlin’s theory of social-epistemic rhetoric has played a valuable role in the
evolution of rhetoric and composition. For one, it attempts to reconnect the study of rhetoric
with an ethical pedagogy immersed in an epistemological foundation. Certainly, this
treatment of ideology as a complex factor in human actions can be seen as an improvement
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over the sense of ideologies as illusions hiding some form of monolithic truth. It is also to
the student’s benefit to consider the influence of rhetoric as more than just advertisements
and political cartoons, as the stuff that makes up their individual perspective in the world.
But, as others have argued (Vitanza, Rickert, Levy), the case for social-epistemic rhetoric
has not been substantiated, even while being used as a key theory for cultural studies
pedagogy.

The Inescapable Nugget of Ideology
For the purpose of drawing out the fundamental problem at the heart of socialepistemic rhetoric, I would like to point to a specific incident through which we might
consider the difference between the supposed objective stance of current-traditional
pedagogy and the liberated subject at work in Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric. This
incident took place on the second episode of an ABC reality series entitled Jamie Oliver’s
Food Revolution, on which Jamie Oliver, a British celebrity chef, attempts to reform the
eating habits of school children in the city of Huntington, West Virginia.
In the episode, Oliver struggles with the fact that the elementary students continue to
choose processed food over home-cooked meals, and thus brings the kids into the kitchen
for a lesson which he emphatically proclaims to the audience “works every time!” Despite
his confidence, Oliver sets up the scene in the form of a question, describing the lesson as an
“experiment to see: Will our kids, if they know something is hideous and disgusting, still eat
it if it’s in the shape and form of something that they love?”
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To start, Oliver pulls out a whole chicken, and with an expert hand quickly slices off
the breast, wings, legs, and thighs. He sets these pieces apart, and conveys that they are the
most valuable elements of the bird. Then, Oliver points to the remainder of the carcass.
“Anyone want to eat some?” he asks, picking up the carcass and shaking it to the moans
(and giggles) of the students. Having reasonably established their disgust, Oliver chops up
the flesh and bone into smaller chunks and proceeds to blend it with chicken skin,
stabilizers, and artificial flavoring in the food processor until it resembles the consistency of
pink, chunky cake batter. After a bit more pomp and circumstance, Oliver throws two
breaded patties of the concoction into a frying pan and assuredly proclaims “Now who
would still eat this?”
With little hesitation, all of the students raise their hands.1
Now, to frame this example in light of the concept of ideology, Oliver believes, in
alignment with the premise of the show, that the children are guided to prefer processed
foods under a veil of false consciousness. This is supported by the Marxist adage, ‘They do
not know it, but they are doing it.’ In visualizing the process behind processed meat
products, Oliver expects the students to be able to act as critics of their own eating practices,
if not at the level of eating what’s healthy, then at least at the level of seeing processed meat
products as unnatural, cheap, and gross. In essence, Oliver’s method situates the problem of

1

To some, the situation might be discounted on the claim that grade-school students are not old enough
to make substantive claims about their eating habits. They might claim that high school or college age
students would be able to make the rational choice not to eat the processed food. To this I contend that
any such act would be purely performative in order to get the established correct answer, and that the
opposite performance on the grade-school children signifies something much more interesting. Either the
students were ignorant of the “right” answer, and answered authentically, or the children fully
understood the correct answer, thought the nuggets were disgusting, and raised their hands only to
improve their chances of becoming a highly viewed clip on YouTube (which they did).
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poor dieting in the realm of rationality, under the assumption that knowing more about the
food means making better decisions about the food.
So how would a pedagogy based in social-epistemic rhetoric handle the situation
differently? In “Rhetoric and Ideology” Berlin actually gives us a (more or less) concrete
example of implementing social epistemic rhetoric in Ira Shor’s lesson for analyzing the
ideology of a fast-food hamburger, which, for all intents and purposes, is driven by the same
motivation as Oliver’s chicken nugget lesson. Schor’s study, “’…not only involved English
and philosophy in [the] use of writing, reading, and conceptual analysis, but it also included
economics in the study of commodity relations which bring the hamburgers to market,
history and sociology in an assessment of what the everyday diet was like prior to the rise of
the hamburger, and health science in terms of the nutritional value of the ruling hamburger’”
(491). In short, Shor’s pedagogical implementation of social-epistemic rhetoric expands on
Oliver’s culinary performance by helping students understand the vast network of social,
historical, and economic factors that go into the prevalence of fast-food.
This change, it seems, is less a change in method than a change in scope. Instead of
describing fast food in terms of its nutritional content and material construction alone,
Oliver should have brought in the discussion of the varied and contradictory ways that the
chicken nuggets become culturally and socially imbued with their perceived deliciousness.
If the student’s only knew of the various ways their diet is socially constructed, the logic
runs, perhaps they would be equipped to override their desire for this delicious token of their
childhood in exchange for foodstuffs that are better for themselves, their community, and
the system at large. Inevitably, the logic here is the same as Oliver’s: the students simply are
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not aware of why they make the decisions they do, and if they were only made aware of
their own discursive construction, they could achieve the critical distance to think through
their choices, nugget related and otherwise, in a rational, constructive manner.
However, as some have pointed out, this mode of “critical distance” from ideology,
from which students are able to critique and change their practices, quickly becomes
implicated in the same nod toward an objective point of view as ideology in terms of true
and false consciousness. Implicit in Berlin’s claim that social-epistemic rhetoric allows
students to become empowered “…agents of social change rather than victims” is the idea
that students are, in some capacity, able to think and act outside of their ideological
constructedness.
In his plenary address at the 1998 CCCC Research Network Forum, Victor Vitanza
famously picked at the fabric of this faith in rationality in his claim that cultural studies, as it
had grown out of social-epistemic rhetoric, overlooked the various ways the composition
classroom had been unable to produce students who demonstrate the characteristics of
Berlin’s liberated consciousness. Indeed, during the speech Vitanza recounts a story of
Berlin’s which questioned the effectiveness of the liberated classroom:
He reported on a student who fully understood how he was being manipulated by the
media machine, understood how he had become an object in the mediascape, but
nonetheless continued cynically to purchase the products that were the object of his
media-driven desire. Yes, the student was but an object purchasing objects! After all,
when everything was said and undone, the student desired some thing to believe in
and to believe for him! (Wasteland).
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To this end, cultural studies pedagogy might solve the first clause of Marx’s
situation (‘they do not know it’) but still fail to address the second clause (‘they are doing
it’). Such is the claim of Peter Sloterdijk in The Critique of Cynical Reason. A rational
approach to political and ethical concerns, Sloterdijk claims, leads to a sense of enlightened
false consciousness, in which the subject is thought to have achieved a position of objective
distance from ideology. This objective position is then undercut by cynicism, wherein the
subject becomes disillusioned by the failure of their objective distance and abandons any
drive to resist the dominant ideologies. In the eyes of Sloterdijk, and later Slovoj Žižek, the
fundamental problem becomes, “they know very well what they doing, but still, they are
doing it.” Or, “they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still they
are doing it” (Žižek 33).

Alternatives to Pedagogies of Liberation
Thomas Rickert, in Acts of Enjoyment, utilizes psychoanalytic theory via Žižek in
order to discuss the problem of cynical students for the teaching of writing, and in doing so
explores, among other things, Vitanza’s claim that cultural studies could be producing a
more adamant generation of cynics. One of the Rickert’s most poignant claims is that in
pedagogies of liberation or empowerment, the student is frequently told that they are free to
critique the institutional controls that render them powerless while simultaneously being
forced to write within the boundaries of what will promote their grade in the class (193).
Rickert defines this as the “forced choice” of liberatory pedagogy, and one that can easily
develop into a cynical affect whereby the student plays out the signs of enjoying their
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ideological liberation as a very function of their adherence to the classroom practices. This
performed liberation then manifests positively in the mind of the teacher, who takes great
pride in his/her ability to empower the students.
Turning back to the chicken nugget example, we can easily imagine a group of older
American students who play up their disgust at the processed nuggets in order to challenge
the stereotypes of their town, their state, and their country. These students, having spent
enough time in school to have experience with such forms of pedagogical desire, would
know that their “choice” is pre-determined by the purposes of the show. The students can
only demonstrate their freedom by picking the chicken breast over the chicken nugget.
Forced choice is further revealed in the fact that Oliver believes the demonstration to be “an
experiment” (and therefore contain the possibility of failure), while simultaneously
operating on infallible logic (he emphatically proclaims, “Works every time!”). In the case
of the young children on the show, Oliver thus both challenges the students to make a
choice, and is defeated when they actually make one.
But while Rickert delivers harsh criticism to the foundations of cultural studies
pedagogy, neither he nor Victor Vitanza are advocates of abandoning the practice of cultural
studies in the classroom altogether. Instead, their points might be better understood as the
attempt to define the limitations of ideology critique in the classroom, and the danger of
reifying pedagogical authority under the pretense of liberation. To rephrase, if we overlook
the way the teacher gains a sense of enjoyment out of sensing a liberated consciousness in
their students, then this “liberated consciousness” will only lead to increasingly confident
teachers and increasingly cynical students.
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There are consequently two approaches I find helpful in moving forward from the
adherence to rational, liberatory pedagogies. The first is Ricket’s own appeal to the presence
of “acts” which arise out of the risk of students to abandon their teacher’s accommodation
of their work. This kind of act, as highlighted by Rickert, uncovers the impossibility of
empowerment in the writing classroom, and refuses to be included in their teacher’s
enjoyment in creating liberated subjects (195). In terms of pedagogy, these acts cannot be
brought about in terms of normal modes of teacher-approved resistance, as such an
opposition between the student and the teacher, as we have seen, is always already slanted
in favor of the teacher’s evaluation. Instead, Rickert describes this pedagogy as, “…less a
body of rules, a set of codifiable classroom strategies, than a willingness to give recognition
and value to unorthodox, unexpected, or troublesome work” (196). To many, I realize (as
does Rickert), this undermines the very definition of what pedagogy is designed to do, and
gives teachers an indeterminate model for implementing such a pedagogy. Still, I find it to
be a useful model for articulating a version of student subjectivity where resistance is still
possible.
The second approach I find useful is Lisa Langstraat’s argument for a more
sophisticated concern for the impact of affect in the composition classroom. “To theorize the
difference between a cynical action, an empathetic action, a fearful action, and angry
action—or any combination of such emotional actions--,” Langstraat argues, “is to theorize
the ways in which our actions are not only tempered by affect, but are rhetorically and
communally constructed through affect” (“The Point Is” 315). While Langstraat’s eventual
gesture is back to the primacy of rationality and to an “authentic” sense of subjectivity in
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service of feminist rhetorics, her discussion of emotions as an epistemologically discursive
element can help us to locate the kind of “risky acts” that Rickert suggests.
Using these two methods of working through the cynical leftovers of
enlightenment, the important elements of Jamie Oliver’s chicken nugget “experiment” are
no longer about how to best historicize the process behind “processed chicken.” Instead, we
might review the interplay of desire at work in the students and in the host, and the way this
desire inhabits the emotions of those involved. Oliver’s desire plays out in the fantasy that
he is the knowing pedagogue whose job is to reveal the error of eating fast food. The
students become a function of this desire, as (from Oliver’s perspective) they groan where
Oliver imagines they should groan and giggle where he believes they should giggle. The
students consequently matter to Oliver less as individuals and more as a function of his
political project.
The children’s desire, unlike Oliver’s, arrives in a decidedly more ambiguous way,
since the incident is narrated from Oliver’s perspective. Still, we can see the student’s desire
for their own sense of coherent reality in the excitement with which they answer Oliver’s
questions. Indeed, when Oliver puts the chicken on the table and asks the students “Now
who knows what this is?” several of students eagerly proclaim the answer. One even jumps
up and down with enthusiasm. Later, when Oliver waves bits of the chopped carcass at the
students, the students mix reactions of disgust with smiles and giggles. As Oliver spends
time making the nugget patties, the children watch with mild interest. At each of these
junctures the children’s emotional energies structure their perspective of the lesson.
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When the students are finally given the “choice” of eating or not eating the nuggets,
and all of the students raise their hands, they smile; seemingly aware they have just given
the wrong answer. Asked about why they chose the nuggets, the students frankly state,
“because we were hungry!” One perspective is that an expert chef just spent fifteen minutes
making chicken nuggets from scratch in front of the students, and just when he throws them
into a hot, sizzling frying pan he asks who wants one?! From the student’s perspective it’s
difficult to answer any other way.
While some might understand the student’s behavior as a sign of ignorance, very few
would call their knowing smiles a sign of cynicism. Instead, the students seem to
sympathize with Oliver, who is visibly shaken by the encounter. Indeed, Langstraat’s
description of the cynical attitudes as characterized by a “skeptical distrust and anxious
pessimism” does not seem to be the affective mode undercutting the students’ decisions
(293). This is not to say the incident is incredibly productive, after all the students do
continue to eat the chicken nuggets, but that their refusal (or inability) to see themselves as
Oliver’s politicized objects should not be immediately disregarded as a worthless
pedagogical moment.
Moreover, there is one more level of affect at work in this example, an affect which,
I argue, is largely under theorized in the turn to affective pedagogical methods: that of
humor. In terms of the emotional power of the show, the episode itself has spawned far less
of a reaction than the clip entitled “Jamie Oliver – Nugget Experiment Epic Fail” which has
gained over one million views on YouTube. The term “epic fail” has to do not only with the
Oliver’s failure, but is a popular label for a specific genre of humorous production. These
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epic fail jokes, in distinction from other forms of ridicule-based humor, usually locate the
“failure” as the very claim to empower the audience. Thus, the humor in the chicken nugget
story comes from Oliver’s fundamental misrecognition that his students are being
enlightened. If this misrecognition is always present in the hope of pedagogy, which is to
say, if the teacher downplays the always already ideological classroom, then there is room
for the teacher’s desire to be returned in the form of this epic fail joke structure.
On the surface, both Langstraat and Rickert show distrust for humorous affect in the
classroom. Rickert cautions against how “we are all in on the joke, we acknowledge the
simulacrum with the knowing wink, and we hunker down to necessity and work with the
suspicion there is little to be done” (184). Likewise, Langstraat rejects a stance she describes
as “responding in kind—cynically agreeing (with a wide grin) that it’s all farcical
business…” (294). These concerns point to the way cynicism and humor often work in
tandem, where humor can become just another mechanism for coordinating the performance
of the teacher and the performance of the student.
But these sentiments look past the humor that isn’t always produced by the students
or the teacher, the humor that comes from the situation itself at the very point of
misrecognition. This humor, akin to what makes the epic failure “epic,” is a product of the
classroom situation itself. Taking a form that is neither rational nor oppositional, an
increased sensitivity to humor might reveal the kind of “acts” Rickert describes in terms of
the momentary breakdown of the classroom claim to critical distance.
Through the chapters that follow, I suggest that a humorous affect in the
classroom can be a productive way of working through the problems of cynicism which
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have been discussed here at length. This discussion begins not at a reconsideration of
humor, but at a reconsideration of what we mean by a “productive” classroom environment.
To this end, the first major chapter is devoted to major scholarly arguments over how the
rhetorical canon of invention defines the rhetorical process. Discussions of invention have
long dealt with the way our epistemological assumptions come to bear on the
implementation and evaluation of pedagogy, and thus provide us with a helpful framework
for situating both a theory and method of considering humor in the classroom.
Next, I apply this framework of inventional pedagogy onto the actual techniques
used by professional stand-up comedians to learn how to “do” comedy. I am here most
interested in the phrase “truth in comedy” as it plays out in the writing, revision, and
performance of stand-up comedy. By tracing the various definitions of this comic “truth,”
we are able to see the extent to which existing theories of rhetorical invention line up with
comedic methods. In essence, I attempt to move from a theory of how comedians create
their material to how this material works at the level of epistemology, which is to ask: how
does humor impact our desire to conceive of reality as a consistent, rational concept?
From exploring the comedic strategies for invention I finally return to the question
of how we might best conceive of the humor that is always already at work in the
composition classroom. The point of this chapter is less to outline a specific assignment or
pedagogical position than to better understand the slips and fissures in the performance of
pedagogy. This will ultimately not get us to the “great good place” where we as teachers are
no longer implicated in the reproduction of institutional power, nor will it alleviate the sense
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of disciplinary anxiety over the matter. All the same, it will provide needed clarification of
the intersection between pedagogy, subjectivity, and emotional culture.
This chapter concludes with a section which points to further areas for research,
primarily with respect to the other canons of rhetoric. The arc of this project focuses on the
canon of invention because of its importance to the field and its direct relation to
epistemology, but the same kind of turn to humorous affects in the other canons could lead
to a more dynamic understanding of the discipline as a whole. We have only just begun to
explore the wide expanses beyond/within rational consciousness.
What should become clear by the end of this project is that, in our humorous affect,
we do not have to laugh as one. Not as one unified subject, laughing himself above/below
all ideologies. Not as one unified group, laughing at being “in” on the joke. Instead we
might imagine that jokes are only ever a rational recovery from laughter as we try to
retroactively recall whatever was so inescapably hilarious in the first place.
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CHAPTER TWO
A FRAMEWORK FOR ALIGNING EMOTIONS WITH THEORIES OF INVENTION
The release of atomic energy has not created a new problem. It has merely
made more urgent the necessity of solving an existing one.
--Albert Einstein
X, to whom I say that his manuscript (a weighty tome attacking television)
is too dissertative, insufficiently protected aesthetically, gives a start at
this word and immediately gives me back as good as I gave: he has had
many discussions of The Pleasure of the Text with his friends; my book,
he says, “keeps brushing up against catastrophe.” No doubt catastrophe, in
his eyes, is to fall into the aesthetic.
--Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes 104
One of the more curious metaphors in Langstraat’s call for an increased attention
to emotion culture comes in the form of “emotional energy.” For example she argues that
“cynicism is so pervasive, so naturalized in our everyday interactions and discourse, that
even recognizing it as a cause and effect of social marginality requires enormous
emotional and pedagogical energy” (320 my emphasis). This metaphor extends to
Langstraat’s characterization of emotions as something to be “tapped into” when we are
able to find a serviceable “emotional outlet” (319, 318). Likewise, Langstraat warns us
that cynicism “depletes our affective energies” to the extent that we may arrive at a point
“when cynicism can no longer emotionally sustain us” (300).
To this end, the question becomes: if affect is to be considered as a form of
energy, where does this energy come from? How is it created? 2 If our emotional energy

2

And, outside of the purview of this chapter, but endlessly fascinating nonetheless, is the question of how
this definition of energy works in parallel to the laws of physics, particularly in the case of thermodynamics
and/or the theory of special relativity. In this respect I think it is no mistake that David Harvey critiques a
mass-media driven, postmodern culture in that it creates “an emotional ground tone of time-space
compression” (291).
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can be “depleted,” how then do we become reenergized beyond the solution of a solid
meal and a good night’s sleep? Is the energy used to produce humor the same kind of
energy used to found other emotions? And most importantly, how does this consideration
of “emotional energy” manifest itself in the composition classroom? What impact can
emotion have on the ideologies that necessarily underwrite the goals of pedagogy, and
increasingly lead to cynical student attitudes? These questions point to the need for us to
clarify the implications of defining emotional states as having a productive quality. The
question of how a teacher might encourage certain emotions, in other words, is just as
important as the form of subjectivity those emotions, in turn, produce.
It is directly out of these types of questions that we might ground this idea of
emotional energy using the rhetorical canon of invention. Invention, as defined by
Richard Young in “Invention: A Topographical Survey,” is the “rhetorical art concerned
with dis-covering the subject matter of discourse” (1). More than the other four canons of
rhetoric, a focus on invention provides a bridge between content of communication as
well as the process of creating that very content. In theory, the move toward invention
should help define how we (and also if we) might “tap” the emotional energy in the
composition classroom as well as what that energy would look like if it were to be
accessed.
To this end, the focus throughout this chapter on the histories and theories of
invention will provide a framework for identifying how comedians conceive of their own
writing processes. Comedy provides a fitting situation for this application in several
respects, not the least of which is the fundamental anxiety comedians place on the writing
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process. Much like the variety of debates over whether rhetoric can be taught, how it
should be taught, and the effects of certain methods of teaching, comedians are generally
obsessed with the problem of whether comedy can be taught, how it should be taught,
and how teaching methods influence the purpose of their craft. This obsession results in
the contemporary practice of comedy coursework, “how-to” guides to comedy, and other
educational guides that will provide a concrete set of examples for the perceptions of
invention outlined in this chapter. The outlining of the history of invention, then, provides
a method for categorizing the diverse assortment of comedic invention strategies and to
consequently make claims about how we might better understand the consequences for
producing different types of emotion in the composition classroom.
However, we should not take the canon of invention to be a universal solvent,
offering us a clear, unmitigated perspective of affective production. Situating invention
epistemologically, and likewise situating affect in the process of invention, is far from
being considered unproblematic in the field of rhetoric and composition. Indeed, it is less
that affective classroom engagement poses a set of new problems that might be solved
using the lens of invention, and more that any consideration of affect in the classroom
leads to the same set of questions that are inevitably asked of inventional pedagogy,
namely: how do we get from nothing (or at least the perceived state of having no writing
or no emotional energy) to something? As we will see in the following chapter, the
answer to this question hearkens back to the even deeper issue of how we define rhetoric
itself.
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The Sophists and the Inventive Capacity of Kairos
Looking historically at the definition of invention we might best start with the
sophists, who were a group of ancient Greeks considered “the first to infuse rhetoric with
life” (Poulakos 36). Learning to speak well was very important in Greek culture, both
because of the social significance of eloquent speech and the political significance of
having an impact on the democracy. Therefore rhetoric was one of the most important
subjects for a man’s education, and the rhetorician was considered to be one of the top
professions of the day (Ijsseling 10). For the sophists truth was created through language,
as “things appear[ed] through virtue of language and convictions [were] the result of
being convinced” (Ijsseling 11). In other words, using language effectively meant the
ability to construct reality; rhetoric was considered to have epistemological power.
Though rhetoric had not yet been aligned with the five canons, and consequently
with no formal theory of invention, the sophists understood language to be brought about
by the urgency of the moment, known as kairos. While the sophists were always
“permeated and enveloped” by language, the decision was not “whether to speak but
whether to speak right now; more precisely, it is whether now is the time to speak”
(Poulakos 40). For some scholars, this sophistic sense of kairos can be related to the time,
place, and audience of a speech, since these factors had a significant impact the form that
the “truth” would take in that particular moment. The invention of language, then, would
come from the urgency to take control over the rhetorical situation at the correct time, or
else “miss their chance to satisfy situationally shared voids within a particular audience”
(Poulakos 39). To teach this kairotic impulse would have required a systematic
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evaluation of the values of the audience and the best way to utilize the circumstances at
hand.
However, another group of scholars, notably Bernard Miller, connected the idea
of kairos to Heidegger’s idea of an ontological dimension of language that possesses
humankind: kairos is the augenblick in which Being is nearest to humans (Lauer 14).
What is so radical about this notion of kairos is that it is not an element of the situation
that can be evaluated and controlled. Instead, this form of kairos comes from outside of
the speaker’s control, in which the speaker is irrationally driven to speak and becomes a
subject to the desire of making meaning. Invention within this paradigm consists less of a
structured system of rules to follow than an exigency that takes over the speaker who is
enabled under the right circumstances. This inventive power is not a function of the
conscious mind and therefore is less concerned about being explicitly taught; however,
some scholars suggest that it can be learned through “the kind of situation that inspires
imagination and creativity” (Worsham 199).
The sophists’ view of epistemology and in turn their definition of invention
includes a productive emotional capacity. Since, for the sophists, reality was constructed
by the language of the speaker, one of the most important models for sophistic thinking
came from the emotional arts of the ancient poets whose deemed language a gift from the
gods (de Romilly 6). Indeed, it is no coincidence that Gorgias, one of the most (in)famous
sophists, is defined by both Untersteiner and Jaqueline de Romilly through his appeal to a
tragic aesthetic in Ecomium of Helen (Lauer 15, Romilly 5). For the sophists, the
invention of speech and the circulation of emotions were implicitly integrated into the

20

idea of a kairos, as a force that brings about meaning from beyond the range of rational
apparatuses. Kairos, then, is one way to align the epistemological function of invention in
rhetoric with a possible treatment of what we might call emotional energy, as emotions as
implicated in the fundamental non-rational kairotic presence.

Platonic Invention Strategies
But while these less formal approaches to invention worked well for sophistic
teachers, the philosophers and rhetoricians who followed required increasingly more
pragmatic modes of invention to support their differing epistemological perspectives.
Particularly critical of the sophistic method was Plato, who considered reality to exist
independent of language and rhetoric. Where the sophists saw a divine or magical quality
in language, Plato saw a fundamental ambiguity that enabled orators to conceal a false
proposition with a persuasive style of speaking (Ijsseling 14). For Plato, rhetoric dealt
only with opinion (doxa), and had no say in the realm of the true essence or knowledge
(episteme) of a given situation.
Because Plato’s epistemology differed greatly from that of the sophists, his
strategies for invention involved the notion of dialectic as opposed to the sophistic
dependence on kairos, which put the emphasis on dialogue to help a speaker find the truth
within him in order to speak. Through the “inner word and its binding command” Plato
credited the philosopher with the ability to access a grounded idea of ethics, and thus
argued that rhetoric was only considered morally justified if it was used to defend what
was found to be the Truth in the course of dialectic. According to Plato, “A man must
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first know the truth about every single subject on which he speaks or writes” (Plato
277b). Thus, the proper course of invention for Plato came less from the audience or the
rhetorical situation than from the truths mastered and understood internally.
Plato’s internalized epistemology suggests two different relationships between
emotion and invention. The first runs parallel to Plato’s characterization of rhetoric in
that the consideration of how to integrate emotion ultimately came after the truth had
been discovered through the course of dialectic. Within a platonic epistemology there are
ethical ways to use emotion (to persuade others of the truth), and unethical ways to use
emotion (to persuade others of what is not true), but in both cases the use of emotion did
not help the speaker to find truth. In other words, emotion had no part in the creation of
meaning or the starting point of writing, but instead was merely seen as an ornamental
addition that might be better fitted to the role of style.
In the Phaedrus, which some consider to represent Plato’s most “mature”
description of invention, Plato locates a more complicated relationship of the emotions to
epistemology. In one of several noteworthy metaphors in the text, Socrates divided the
soul into three parts--two horses and a charioteer. The charioteer, easily enough, stands
for the role of reason or intellect which is used to guide the soul to truth, but the horses
serve their own function within the narrative. One of the horses Socrates describes as “a
follower of the true reknown; it needs no whip, but is driven by the command of word
alone” while the other horse is described as “a great jumble of a creature…the mate for
insolence and knavery…hardly heeding whip or spur” (38). The first horse, we might say,
stands for a rational order, obedient to the charioteer. The second horse, “a dreadful,

22

lawless thing,” is more akin to the irrational drive of passion, challenging the authority of
the charioteer, but still necessary for the discovery of truth.
This definition of emotional energy, or what might be better described as
“passion,” performs a remarkably different role for Plato than more ornamental
considerations of emotion. The wild horse of passion is not only present in the process of
discovering truth, but is necessary to it. As Elizabeth Belfiore notes in “Dancing with the
Gods: The Myth of the Chariot in Plato’s ‘Phaedrus,’” the black horse’s “tendencies to
leap about have positive aspects, for it is always the black horse who pulls the chariot
toward the beloved” (189). Though this passion is constrained by the power of the
charioteer (aka intellect), it still presents a form of emotional energy separate from the
merely ornamental. Consequently, Plato’s epistemology presents us with both a second
and third measure for coordinating invention with epistemology and emotional capacity;
in the first sense invention has little to do with emotion, and in second sense the process
of invention involves restraining one’s passion to the point of submission. Importantly,
both of these models are distinctively different from the sophistic model, which involves
allowing the irrational passion to make meaning take hold of the speaker instead of
imagining that those forces can be displaced or considered internally.

Invention in Post-Sophistic Rhetoric
One of the characteristic features of the post-sophistic teachers of rhetoric was
(and in many ways still is) the focus on the techniques of employing rhetoric, and thus to
outline a set of tools that would turn both the teaching and learning of rhetoric into a
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clearer, more rational process. Of these sets of tools, some of the most resilient have
come from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which is in many ways the theoretical engine that puts
rhetoric in motion within composition textbooks today. Though Aristotle respected the
sophists, he worked to clear up the “state of confusion and incoherence” that marked the
state of rhetoric at the time (Poulakos 151), and in doing so attempted to clearly define
the epistemological capacity and available tools for rhetorical practice.
One of the key tasks for Aristotle was to situate the position of rhetoric in context
with philosophy, and toward this task Aristotle posited the concept of the enthymeme. As
a particular species of syllogistic reasoning, the enthymeme is constructed like a
syllogism in most senses, but is distinguished by the fact that one of the premises is left to
be filled in by the audience. The significance of the enthymeme had a major impact for
the way rhetoricians made epistemological claims, for the difference between philosophy
and rhetoric became centered on philosophy’s interest in “the actual form of things”
while rhetoric became centered on “the way things partake in these forms” (Poulakos
154). In essence, the philosopher might consider the question of what it means to be
ethical, and the rhetorician would then consider the question of whether a specific person
had acted ethically in a specific situation.
To this end, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines rhetoric as ”not to persuade but to
see the available means of persuasion in each case,” and goes on outline a number of
rhetorical strategies that a rhetor might “see” (1355a). These strategies include 28
common topics for general argumentation as well as three special topics to help the rhetor
conceive of their speech through three purposes of discourse (epideictic, deliberative, and
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judicial). Using these sets of tools, the rhetor was able to adapt his message to his
audience in a logical, coherent way. In so doing, Aristotle hoped to turn rhetoric from its
origin in informal oratory practice into a disciplined field of study (Poulakos 181).
Another one of Aristotle’s major classifications came to bear on the kinds of
artistic proofs or pisteis that could be employed to persuade the audience. From
Aristotle’s perspective, one of the major weaknesses of sophistic thinking was the way it
“emphasized inordinately emotional appeals, personal appearances, and stylistic
techniques of delivery” (159). Addressing this weakness, Aristotle divided the sophistic
notion of logos, which, for the sophists, meant control of language, into three parts: ethos
(the appeal to one’s character), pathos (the appeal to emotion) and logos (redefined as the
appeal to reason) (170). Through these categories, Aristotle worked to redefine rhetorical
invention from an irrational force that takes hold of the speaker into a rational force that
the speaker could more consciously utilize.
Pathos, as a concept split off from the concept of logos, became a tenuous concept
for Aristotle, since in some ways he was preserving a connection to the irrational modes
of persuasion exercised by the sophists. Thus, in order to completely systematize rhetoric
as a field of study, Aristotle depicted the presence of emotions in language as part of a
rational communicative procedure. In other words, Aristotle argued that there are reasons
why an audience will feel the emotions that they do, and that the audience will therefore
not only be able to sense the presence of emotions within themselves, but will also be
able to consciously integrate those emotions as a kind of proposition in the rhetor’s
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argument (175). In this model, emotional appeals could be methodically employed and
evaluated for their usefulness, much the same as one might do for a logical appeal.
In some ways, this Aristotelian model provided what might be considered one of
the most useful methods for inventing discourse, since the topics presented a speaker with
a concrete set of strategies for any argument. Is the opponent of the argument questioning
your character for taking the only possible choice in the argument? Then try topic number
seven and ask the opponent if he would not have made the same choice in the same
situation (194). Does the speech need to inspire the audience that one particular course of
action in the future will be to their greatest benefit? Then follow the rules for the special
topic of deliberative rhetoric in order to best persuade the audience. While some could
argue that the employment of the topics was less mathematical than these two examples,
the appeal of the topics was tied to this straightforward nature and it allowed a rhetor to
easily situate discourse within a specific time period and toward a fixed goal.
Even as he painted this rational picture of emotion as communication, however,
Aristotle still warned that “…it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or
envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straightedge rule crooked before
using it” (1354a). In this light we can see that even though Aristotle makes reference to
the power of emotions to influence perceptions, he does so with the caveat that emotions
are, at times, a disruptive influence, especially when inciting a dissonance toward logical
reasoning. But while Aristotle points to the possibility of improper use of the emotional
appeals, it remains unclear as to how one might distinguish between the necessary
pathetic appeals and those that “warp” the audience. Indeed, this nod to the warping of an
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audience signals that, despite attempts to classify rhetoric as a rational procedure, there
will always be some kernel of emotional force that exceeds the limits of codification.
At this point we can see how Aristotle’s program starts to fracture under the
pressure of the very classification I hope to create in this chapter, namely the correlation
between epistemology, rhetorical invention, and emotional energy. After the sophists,
emotions were still seen to provide an important function for rhetoric, yet this power was
always subservient to the power of logic. The emotions retained their role as a means of
persuasion, but always contained the possibility for deception.
This troubled relationship between logic and emotion, however, is less the
product of Aristotle’s method in particular, and more the product of answering one of the
foundational questions of rhetorical theory: what does it mean to call rhetoric an “art”?
Such is the issue at hand in Lynn Worsham’s “The Question Concerning Invention:
Hermeneutics and the Genesis of Writing,” in which Worsham traces how the definition
of invention through one of two meanings of art has had a drastic implications for the
way we understand the function of rhetoric today.
On the one hand, Worsham points to an understanding of art as a teachable
practice, one that can be passed on from person to person in spite of their talent or natural
propensity for it. This definition of art, which Worsham terms “art-as-knowledge,”
reinforces the importance of teacher and student roles for the study of rhetoric, since it
implies not only that rhetoric can be taught, but that by attending the lessons of a strong
teacher or by being a diligent student a person could potentially learn to employ rhetoric
in more persuasive ways. To define rhetoric in any other way, especially as a kind of
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knack or natural ability, would lead to the critique of the very concept of a school
devoted to teaching rhetoric, and consequently discrediting the role of sophist teachers in
ancient Greek life.
The other artistic dimension of rhetoric focuses on rhetoric as an intuitive process,
distinguishing rhetoric from being seen as a mere “craft.” Whereas employing a craft
only requires the knowledge of a rote set of skills or techniques, a work of art depends on
the role of the artist’s imagination, of a moment of genesis where the work in some way
transcends the materials that were used to create it. To think of rhetoric as an art in this
sense relates the epistemological dynamics of rhetoric, as this imaginative quality enables
rhetoric to discover new knowledge, instead of the application of the same techniques to
every situation. Thus, this definition, which Worsham defines as “art-as-magic,” becomes
just as important to the function of rhetoric as the definition of “art-as-knowledge.” But
even to ask the question, “what does it mean to call rhetoric an art?” forces us to
foreclose on these two perspectives and privilege one of these two important functions.
Referencing Jacqueline de Romilly’s Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece,
Worsham attends to the same historical moment in which rhetoric was forced to define
itself as an art, a choice which ultimately guided the use of rhetoric in a more orderly
direction. “The development of classical rhetoric can be read,” according to Worsham,”
as an attempt to purge rhetoric of its long association with magic and provide a
systematic treatment of these techniques, a treatment that gives the technical aspect of
rhetoric a proper philosophical and ethical foundation” (200). This systematic treatment,
both in Aristotle’s organizational scheme and in Worsham’s description of rhetoric as
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indebted to an “art-as-knowledge” will be my fourth final frame for situating
epistemology, invention, and emotional energy. Within a perspective that considers
rhetoric to construct reality through an ordered system of topics and species, emotions
become less embodied reactions than one more useful tool in employing purposeful
communicative acts.

Refrain
This digression from the specifics of Aristotle to generalities of the art of rhetoric,
while it may seem to belabor the point, serves two critical purposes for my discussion.
First, while Aristotle’s configuration of inventive strategies provides a classic privileging
of rational argumentation, Aristotle’s topics are essentially part of a larger trend that not
only shaped a contemporary idea of rhetoric, but shaped it in the name of certainty and
pragmatism. This foundation has enabled rhetoric to maintain a particular resilience
despite attempts to repress and malign it over the course of history. Aristotle is a valuable
example for my discussion, especially in terms of the uneasy relationship between pathos
and logos, but to limit the discussion to his specific method is to miss the larger picture of
how a definition of rhetoric steeped in rationality attempts to solve a fundamental
disciplinary tension between the epistemological and practical considerations.
Second, the relationship between the Aristotle and the “art” at the core of rhetoric
advances a nuanced perspective of rationality that becomes necessary for considering
how the four major frames of invention relate back to the discussion of ideology from the
first chapter. This applies somewhat less to Plato who, considering his epistemology,
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would probably agree with Marx’s definition of ideology as a form of “false
consciousness.” In this same vein, both of Plato’s inventive treatments correspond with
Marx’s concern that “they do not know it, but they are doing it.” In one sense Plato
thought that the invention stage occurs only after we’re aware of how to conform our
discourse to the “correct” ideological position. In another sense, Plato’s model does
afford some inventional capacity to the ability of an individual to apprehend a
transcendent truth, or the seemingly “correct” ideological position. Thus in the next
chapter I will point out two different inventional strategies that relate comedy to the
expression of a transcendent truth, one that positions comedy as a way to find the truth
via an internalized dialectic process, and the other to communicate a truth conceived prior
to the turn to comedy.
The sophistic and post-sophistic attitudes toward invention, however, differ less in
their definition of ideology than in the implications of their methodologies for agency as
shaped by ideological production. By this I mean that both Aristotle and the Sophists
could agree with Therbon’s description of ideology as “…the constitution and patterning
of how human beings live their lives as conscious, reflecting initiators of acts in a
structured, meaningful world” (Berlin 479). Yet, while Aristotle would argue that this
patterning occurs because of a rhetor’s successful employment of rational communicative
action, the sophists would argue that this same pattern develops out of powers which, in
part, come from beyond the limits of linguistic construction.
On this basis, the appropriate match for Aristotelian inventive strategies is
Berlin’s cultural studies pedagogy, which asserts that by employing the seemingly
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rational tool of cultural critique students will gain distance and agency in relation to their
own ideological orientation. Likewise, the sophistic notion of invention I’ve defined in
this chapter, an opening up to what lies beyond rational models of communication,
suggests a correlation with Rickert’s turn to a risky pedagogy that questions the very
underlying empowerment that Aristotle and Berlin hope to imbue. To sense these two
veins in the invention strategies of comedians I will consequently ask questions about the
way comedians see their own power to define reality. Is comedy, in the eyes of
comedians, a controlled communicative act using the signal of laughter to demonstrate
that the joke has produced the desired epistemological outcome? Or do comedians,
similar to the sophists, find the power of their jokes to function beyond the role of
practical argumentation?

Beyond Berlin
Given the four frames that I’ve described in this chapter, some might argue that
I’m simply using the same taxonomy employed by Berlin in his essay “Contemporary
Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories.” Why can we not simply apply the titles
of Current-Traditional Rhetoric, Expressivist Rhetoric, Classical Rhetoric, and New
Rhetoric to these models of invention? The answer lies in Rickert’s treatment of Berlin in
Acts of Enjoyment, in which Rickert traces the foundation of Berlin’s taxonomy to the
communications triangle, a tool that divides the operation of communication into the
speaker, the listener, the message, and reality, and moreover implies that how the rhetor
focuses on these four aspects will define the shared aims of a particular discourse.
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Though Rickert cites a number of underlying problems with widespread
application of the communications triangle, his main critique eventually comes to land on
Berlin’s belief that his four epistemological positions were appropriate for mapping the
relationship between pedagogy and reality. “Even redefined or reconceptualized,” argues
Rickert, “the trace of Kinneavy’s original Neo-Aristotelian categorization remains” (42).
In the end, the same reliance on the rational subject that I have attributed to Berlin up to
this point leads Rickert to conclude that Berlin’s four pedagogies “produce a particular
and troubling epistemological orientation” (42). As long as Berlin adhered to a model of
discourse that was constructed on a valuing of rational communication, his theory for
New Rhetoric, no matter how aware of epistemological nuances, was bound to limit
discourse to a mode of production.
Consequently, it is vital for my framework of invention, especially in the case of
sophistic and post-sophistic perspectives, to maintain some distance from Berlin’s
taxonomy, and furthermore from the concept of the communications triangle. As I will
demonstrate in the next chapter, to apply a model of communication to humor is to
sterilize what is arguably its most powerful component: laughter. Without laughter,
humor fits rather easily into a number of productive communicative systems, but it also
loses the feature that defines it as humor in the first place. Such is the essential paradox
that confounded Aristotle’s ability to discuss emotion epistemologically; such is the
problem of Berlin’s liberated subject-turned cynic; such is the trouble of defining rhetoric
as an instrument to be employed. These over-determinations, made in the name of
empowering the individual subject, actually end up achieving quite the opposite effect,
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closing off the possibility for ideological change to occur as language is used to facilitate
the fantasy that we control the environment around us.
I have subsequently aimed to achieve some level of theoretical distance from
Berlin’s taxonomy by resisting the urge to base my framework on the features of
communicative models, and instead put emphasis on the epistemological assumptions
that founded various perspectives of invention. This is not to say that my characterization
completely abandons Berlin’s scheme, as a reader who is familiar with “Major
Pedagogical Theories” will be able to feel the influence of his theories both in this
chapter and those to come. Instead, it is my goal to expand Berlin’s taxonomy by
applying pressure to its limitations, morphing the uniformity of the triangle into a slightly
more nebulous conceptualization.
In this same turn, the categories here should not be read as an exhaustive
taxonomy or that in these four veins we gain access to a comprehensive description of all
modes of making meaning in the world. As Rickert claims, “a different theory of
discourse would necessarily produce a different map of the field,” (42) and we should
likewise leave open the possibility that an alternate theory of discourse would lead to a
different valuation of inventive strategies than what I have presented in this chapter.

33

CHAPTER THREE
SELECTED METHODS OF COMEDIC INVENTION: KEEPING LAUGHTER ALIVE
Humor can be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process
and the innards are discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind.
E.B. White, A Sub-Treasury of American Humor

In search of a way of working through ideology in the composition classroom I
have poked at the root of two complementary frustrations. The first is that ideology
continuously circumvents an attempt to escape from it, or even to reach a safe vantage
point from which to wrangle it into regulation. Second is the troubled relationship
between logic and emotion when applied to an epistemology built on argumentation. At
the junction of these two frustrations it becomes necessary to look to modes of writing
that not only allow for the play of extra-rational forces, but require their presence. This is
to say that modes of discourse that are commonly assumed to be unemotional or
emotionally neutral do not engender the kind of attitude I am after, as these forms of
discourse would be less likely to exhibit tension between their epistemological goals and
their emotional leanings. Such modes of discourse do contain this tension, as even the
most neutral discourse relates emotional energy in its very call to seriousness; however,
common assumptions about the anesthetic quality of serious discourse provide an
arbitrary resistance to the framework of invention I propose, and thus is less useful for
my purposes than modes of writing that readily acknowledge emotional complexity.
Therefore, through the following chapter I turn to accounts of comedic writing
practices as suitable territory for exploring the relationship between ideology and the
limits of rationality. Unlike modes of writing that lay claim to emotional neutrality,
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comedic writing practices are geared toward (what we will call for now) an emotional
response at their very core (laughter). Likewise, the epistemological role of comedy is
often debated both in popular culture and by comedians themselves, advancing some
comedians to the role of social critics while reducing others to be devoid of any cognitive
impact outside of the basest form of entertainment. The intersection between emotion and
epistemology, which in self-consciously “serious” discourse is subdued at all costs, is
openly expressed in discussions of comedic discourse, and thus comedy presents a fertile
environment for considering the matters at hand. Yet, a critical appraisal of comedy
comes with a different set of disciplinary intricacies and methodological stumbling
blocks than those described to this point, so before I render comedy through various
approaches to invention, I must first frame my methodology in relation to what I will call
the dead frog paradox.

Reducing the Amphibian Death Toll
There are a number of possible scholarly approaches to humor, from the
sociological, to the psycholinguistic, to the literary. But no matter the field of analysis,
many navigations of humor come back to the E.B. White quote mentioned in the epigraph
to this chapter, which is often used to discount or hedge critical analyses of humor. Using
White’s dead frog metaphor, critics of humor analyses claim that no matter how carefully
one investigates the underlying process of humor, the results will always come to an
incomplete model of how humor is created and deployed. This is to say that while an
analysis of humor might be able to point to a set of reliable patterns in joke structures or
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comedic practice, something critical to the study of humor is lost in the very process of
analysis which cannot be recovered from the material of a series of joke-corpses.
One answer to White’s concern commonly taken by empirical studies of humor is
to acknowledge and simply ignore it, as does Debra Aarons in Jokes and the Linguistic
Mind. Aarons admits early in the book, “I have been obliged, for reasons of pure science,
scholarship, and professionalism to do my best to kill the jokes. Commentary and
analysis are inevitable companions to jokes, in a book of this sort, and, for this
discouragement, I apologize” (18). Indeed, the nature of the linguistic approach gives
Aarons little other choice than to dissect humor in order to describe its semantic structure,
thus her admittance to (and apology over) studying only the dead jokes. Studies like these
are necessary, as it is better to gain some knowledge of the mechanical principles of jokes
than nothing at all; however, studies with this disposition present an inadequate method
of addressing the epistemological concerns I hope to consider.
Other scholars have come at this question via Wittgenstein’s statement that “a
serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes”
(Dribble 87). In such a methodology scholars assume that the jokes do not have to die in
the course of analysis, especially in cases where they are appropriately incorporated into
the analysis itself. Such is the underlying idea in Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein’s
Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar: Understanding Philosophy through Jokes, which
uses jokes to explain complex philosophical theories. However, while the book does
bring together humor and philosophy, humor is only used as an instrument directed
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towards theory with little attempt to advance a particular theory of humor. The humor can
remain “living” in so far as there is no analytical pressure.
Due to the dead frog paradox, this chapter is not devoted to the analysis of
specific jokes, but instead turns to the tools used by professional comedians to bring their
comedic material to life, thus building an account of what that very “life” might mean,
and how it functions in comedic practice. To this end I turn to comedians as experts not
because comedians have a clear methodology or system that we might tap into, but
because they have seen the most jokes—good jokes, bad jokes, and whatever else—die in
their hands. In effect, this methodology should enable a presentation of humor that can
make claims beyond dissected joke-corpses, while neither ignoring the dead frog issue
nor supposing that the joke-in-life can simply be incorporated into the analysis itself.
In the course of this process I have tried to include insights from stand-up
comedy, improvisational comedy, and sketch writing in order to illuminate the tension
between comedic writing and comedic performance. In sketch comedy there is a clear
separation between the writing and the performance, as in this mode a joke might be
written anytime, from minutes before a show to months ahead of schedule. The written
joke will often culminate in a short-lived presentation on television, on Youtube, or in
stage performances. In these formats, the sketch is designed to live beyond the moment of
its creation. The writing of improvisational comedy lies at the other end of the spectrum,
with the majority of the content being “written” during the course of the performance
itself. Consequently, improvisational comedy is considered to present “new material”
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every performance, so that no matter how funny a show might be, the performers throw
out all their material at the end of the night to start anew the next day.
Stand-up, on the other hand, is written prior to the performance, like sketch
comedy, but also contains some of the ephemeral qualities of improv because of the
speaker’s ability to change the trajectory of the show at any given moment. This leads to
a necessary balance in stand-up comedy between the writing and performance. For this
reason, while there are considerations of sketch writing and improvisational training
included in this chapter, the main focus is on the writing process behind stand-up
comedy. I appreciate the fact that this method is by no means a comprehensive account of
all forms of humor, as we all use humor in one way or another, and what I deem
“professional” comedians are only those who are trained to incite laughter in certain
situations.
I also recognize the fact that this methodology is not faithful to all the disciplinary
tensions that are put to work on humor scholarship. There are strong contingents of
academic researchers such as psychologists, sociologists, and literary researchers
working on the study of humor, as well as a number of non-academics such as therapists,
comedians, and paid speakers. However, these interdisciplinary methods have not come
to a consensus on one theory of humor, either between or within the individual
disciplines. While this discordant nature does not discount the value of such work,
especially as these disciplines continue to share their findings, it does raise concerns over
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whether the well-established theories3 can support all approaches to humor writing,
especially within the framework from the previous chapter. This is yet another reason for
my attempt to approach the relationship between humor and invention from the
comedian’s perspective, as it is rare to see the popular accounts of comedy align with
scholarly theories of humor.
What proceeds from this point is an overview of some of the origins for writing
comedy as suggested by professionals in the field. The methods are largely organized via
the four inventional schemes considered in chapter two, so that through this chapter we
will begin to draw connections between the comedian’s writing process and the problem
of cynicism in the composition classroom.

Platonic Approaches to Comedic Invention Part One: Crafting Comedy
One of the widely proliferated inventive methods for writing comedy, or at least
those that are widely touted through various “how-to” comedy books, is the comedic
formula. Comedic formulas can range from a general theory (try to list things in a list of 3
at a time) to the specific practice (Try incorporating inherently funny words like
“bazinga”). But no matter the set of tools, these formulas are meant to be applied to
serious language in order to imbue it with humorous qualities regardless of the situation.
Of all the rule-based inventive methods, the most pervasive is the “Rule of
Three.” The rule of three states that jokes are best told in three part increments, where the
3

By “major theories” I am referring to superiority theory, incongruity theory, and relief theory, each of
which having a partial hold on humor scholarship today. Also notable in this regard is Victor Raskin’s
general theory of verbal humor which attempts to remain neutral to all three theories by defining verbal
humor through a progression of sematic scripts, but even this sense of neutrality is contested in the field.
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first two parts create a standard or an assumption for the reader (the setup and
anticipation), and the third part breaks the pattern (the punchline). Some claim that this
pattern works because three elements is the lowest number of items that still can achieve
some level of incongruity, and accordingly advocate that comedians try as much as
possible to pare down the parts of a joke to only three ideas (Jasheway 47). Others take a
less strict approach, such as Mel Helitzer in Comedy Writing Secrets who claims that
“although most series-based jokes are most effective when they contain three elements,
the number of introductory elements, the number of setups in the series can be two, three,
four, or as many as you wish—whatever it takes to build anticipation and a climax”
(153). In any case, the rule of three, whether in terms of “setup-setup-payoff” or “setupanticipation-punchline,” is presented in nearly every rules-based methods book for how
to write with/in humor (Vorhaus 105; Helitzer 152; Mendrinos 53; Sedita 27-33).
As a way of writing humor, the rule of three solidifies humor as stable, simple
concept, so much so that John Vorhaus in The Comic Toolbox describes the rule of three
in terms of geometric minimalism. He explains, “Two points define a line. A line
presents a direction. Direction implies expectation: ‘If I continue in this direction, I’ll
move farther along the same line.’ Well, it turns out we can craft a joke just by creating
and then defeating that specific expectation” (Vorhaus 103-104). This rare composite of
humor and geometry makes for an intensely persuasive generalization, leading some
writers to apply the rule of three to a wide range of comedic phenomena. For example
Heiltzer defines three rules for writing comedy that hearken back to the rule of three (the
redundancy of which Helitzer believes to only bolster the power of his claim): “1) Never
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use more than three jokes about one subject in a monologue. 2) Three minutes is the
ideal length for a skit. 3) Don’t exceed three themes in an article”4 (Heiltzer 154, my
emphasis). The rule of threes is so simple, so flexible, that it has enabled many
comedians to make claims similar to those of Heiltzer, broadly directing the need for a
triplet something in comedic writing and performance.
An even more basic but equally prevalent tool in formulaic approaches to writing
comedic material comes from what I will call “the consonant principle.” This rule states
that words with a hard k sound (such as Cadillac) or with a hard g sound (such as
guacamole) are inherently funnier than words without hard consonants. For example,
comedian Fred Allen once stated that “an egg is funny, an orange is not” (Dean 54). Greg
Dean in Step by Step to Stand-Up Comedy cites that this is because the hard consonants
add more “punch” due to the “harsh consonant sound” (53). No matter what type of
humor, or, according to some accounts, no matter what type of writing, the addition of
extra hard consonant sounds will automatically add humor to the situation or joke.
An important permutation of this principle comes in the article “Laughing
Matters” by Leigh Ann Jasheway, which is designed to help creative non-fiction writers
learn the basics of writing with humor. In the article, Jasheway presents five main rules
for incorporating humor, and among the usual suspects such as “The Rule of Three” she
presents what she calls “The K Rule.” The function of the K rule begins much like what I
have described thus far as the consonant principle, that words with a hard k or a hard g
are inherently funny. But where Dean spends a fair amount of time demonstrating the
4

This third rule in the rule of three connects eerily here to the limitation of writing to three body
paragraphs in the implementation of the five paragraph essay.
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principle with jokes, Jasheway attempts to explain the origins of what makes consonants
funny through the nature of the English language. Jasheway claims that “much of what
makes Americans laugh today has roots in Yiddish humor, the language of which
includes many guttural sounds—and the k and hard g are as close as English comes” (47).
In this sense, the consonant principle is inscribed with the logic of cultural difference—
the hard consonants are only funny because of the history of Jewish people who have
been funny.
The cultural rationale doesn’t stop there, however, as it critically inflects upon one
of Jasheway’s most reductive approaches to comedic invention (if it can even be called
invention) highlighted in a chart at the end of the article conspicuously titled “How to
Add Humor Without Really Trying” (Appendix A). The chart features a bevy of words
that “just make us laugh,” many of which clearly emerge from tensions between standard
English and other languages, including “didgeridoo,” “knickers,” and “Shih Tzu” (49).
The list is meant to enable writers to include comedy by simply exchanging the words on
the list with the more serious words in an original text. Implied by this characterization of
writing humor is the idea that there are sets of words that are considered automatically
serious and sets of words that are considered automatically funny, and this distinction
aligns, consciously or unconsciously, with whether a word is included in standardized
models of the English language.
Though there are differences between the consonant principle and the rule of
three, both methods bear the markings of Plato’s disposition toward rhetoric as no more
than an ornament to logical discourse. This is never more clear than in the introduction to
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Jasheway’s article, which frames the purpose of including humor in the idea that “a
smiling reader is one who’s paying attention and eager to read on” (47). Framed as a
mechanism for holding the reader’s interest, humor doesn’t impact the information in a
story, it doesn’t develop an argument, and it certainly doesn’t impact any kind of
underlying truth. Instead, these kinds of goals are accomplished by the seriousness of the
text, and the presence of humor functions only after the serious discourse has been
established. The rule of threes only works in so far as the first two items in the list or
elements in a story are serious enough to setup the turn in the third element. Likewise the
consonant principle imagines that the natural state of writing is in serious language, and
that the addition of humor only enhances what was already there. It is used to decorate
the main ideas in order to “make sure we lasso our readers and keep them in the corral”
(Jasheway 49).
One of the consequences of this approach to invention is that writing with humor
becomes so mechanically driven that it can seem absurdly simplistic, hence the title of
Jasheway’s chart: “How to Add Humor Without Really Trying.” Like the geometric
metaphor for the rule of three, the seemingly effortless nature of the consonant principle
allows it to germinate in the world of comedy, proposed as a basic way of adding humor
to any given situation. And while I have only focused on two of these formulas, there are
a variety of comedy rules that work to this end, from commandments like “no
whispering” (Sedita 220) to more complicated propositions like “if you’re tagging all
your setups with multiple punches you will increase your LPMs (laughs per minute)”
(Dean 62). What defines this style of invention is that these rules are clear, teachable, and
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utterly removed from the creation of meaning itself. Reduced to a routine set of principles
with little epistemological value, these inventive strategies fall on the craft side of the art
vs. craft dichotomy.
However, it is important to note that this method of writing comedy rarely
functions as the only inventional approach that stand-up comedians use to define their
writing process. Jasheway’s article, which I have used to frame a representative model of
comedic writing isolated as formulaic invention strategies, is configured by distancing
comic writing from comic performance. For example, the article draws a clear distinction
between suggestions for attracting the reader to a piece of non-fiction and “confus[ing]
the reader by coming across as a comedian” (49). This divisiveness is even reciprocated
by Vorhaus in his evaluation of the rule of three. Even though Vorhaus’s geometric
description of the rule seems clear and useful, he admits that “The rule of three is not my
favorite tool. It often appears to me, as I’m sure it seems to you, that this rote repetition
of setup, setup, payoff routinely comes out feeling forced and, well, unfunny…but [it] is
a handy little item to have in your back pocket” (106).
It is thus between Jasheway’s caution against becoming a “comedian” and
Vorhaus’s relegation of the formulaic approach to the status of a back-pocket tool, that
we can start to sense the delicate relationship between defining comedy as an art (as
Vorhaus aims to do) and comedy as a craft (as Jasheway aims to do). This tension is
situated on the same considerations highlighted by Worsham in the previous chapter with
regard to rhetoric, wherein a craft-based rhetoric both enables rhetoric to be teachable and
hampers claims to epistemic status. We should therefore be wary of both hasty
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endorsements and hasty rejections of formulaic models of comedic invention, and instead
look to ways that this question of art/craft plays an important role in the discourse on
comedy. To this end, I turn to the debates surrounding one of the more contentious
predicaments for the comedy community in the past few years: the emergence of the
Comedy Evaluator Pro.

The Comedy Evaluator Pro
Publicized as “the ultimate online software for comedy performance
benchmarking and improvement” the Comedy Evaluator Pro, created in 2003, claims to
objectively measure the abilities of any comedian based on a ratio of time the comedian
spends speaking to time the audience spends laughing. According to Steve Roye, the
creator of the software, “For a comedian, they are either performing, or the audience is
responding. Each of those are measurable events. You can take a ratio of one to the other,
and the higher the ratio, the funnier you are” (I Am Comic). The basic operation of the
program requires a person watching live or recorded comedy to hold down the space bar
on the keyboard when the audience is laughing, and to release it when the audience stops
laughing, thus recording Roye’s proposed ratio. After some simple math, the program
gives the performer a “Positive Audience Response” score, or PAR score, which
represents the percentage of each minute of the set that the audience spent laughing
(comedyevaluatorpro.com).
This model of laughter is conceived on precisely the same logic as formulaic
strategies for comedic invention. The PAR score is in no way related to why the audience
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is laughing, or whether the laughter came at the intended points in the comedian’s set.
Rather, the PAR score represents a form of laughter that ignores epistemology in favor of
universal applicability. Inherent in the Comedy Evaluator Pro is the idea that the sound of
laughter, disconnected from all social and temporal contingencies, is an appropriate
identifier of effective comedy, that is, if a comedian’s definition of “effective” has
nothing to do with what that laughter might mean.
The comedy community initially took no notice of Roye’s software, either
because they immediately dismissed it or never heard of it to begin with. But in 2010,
comedian-turned-director Jordan Brady released a documentary called I Am Comic,
which featured, among interviews with working comedians such as Tim Allen, Jeff
Foxworthy, and Jim Gaffigan, a demonstration of the Comedy Evaluator Pro by Roye
himself. By juxtaposing the software with the insights of famous comedians, the film not
only brought attention to the software, but validated its measurement of a PAR score as
an objective measurement of how funny a comedian could be on stage.
Though the director of the movie later slammed the Comedy Evaluator Pro,
claiming that it was only included in I Am Comic for the sake of dramatic tension
(Cransnick), the incident spurred comedians and comedy fans to discuss the validity of
the PAR score. Some worried that the PAR score would become the main evaluation for
being promoted from an opener to a headliner. Others attacked the ethos of the PAR
score by calling attention to Roye’s long line of specious comedy tools, such as
mybestmaterial.com, killerstandup.com, and realfirststeps.com. Still others pointed out
the way that the tool could be manipulated by a “generous” audience or by a large
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audience. But the clearest critique came in the form of a post on the forums of
aspecialthing.com, arguably the most important online forum for comedy discussions, by
user JayRunner:
Using this software I could go up on stage with a stun gun and blast myself in the
thigh, UPROARIOUS LAUGHTER. Then I can pull a petite girl from the
audience to kick me in my testicles, really hard, ROOM EXPLODES. My PAR
score for my 5 minute open mic is 80 and I go home, think about my set, open a
few veins and die as the world's funniest comedian. Here's the problem, I don't
want to just make people laugh, I want to make them laugh at what I think is
funny. (JayRunner)
Through this statement, JayRunner illustrates the dominant resistance to the
formulaic approach to rhetorical invention. Repeatable methods and measurable results,
when considered in isolation, can easily seem like a preposterous way to write comedy.
The missing component of comedy as an art, which JayRunner starts to get at in the
clause “what I think is funny,” is what renders this approach not as a set of absolute laws
for writing jokes as Heiltzer suggests, but instead as a limited instrument and “a handy
little item to have in your back pocket” (Vorhaus 106).
But while it is easy to belittle this first mode of invention, comedy as a craft, we
must not forget that, in some ways, comedy is a craft. This became abundantly clear in
the forum discussion about the Comedy Evaluator Pro referenced earlier, as notable
comedian Chris Hardwick attempted to diffuse the aggravation toward Roye’s product
with the following post:
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Look, young comics, if something gets you to be critical and evaluate your
set, GREAT. You don't have to live and die by the numbers in this program,
but if it gets you to think about what you're doing and how you can improve
then it can't be all that bad... I'm sorry to break this to you, but stand-up is not
more art than science. It's both. Equally. The art is how you express your ideas
but the science is in the crafting of it. To consistently sustain your art you
need the structure of science to hold it in place and re-calibrate it often. At
least, that's what I've found in the 11 years I've been doing it. I commend this
guy for trying to nerdify stand-up, whether or not it works for everyone. As
someone who likes putting systems in place, I appreciate where it's coming
from. Would I use it? I'd probably try it just out of curiosity and in a spirit of
fun, but I certainly wouldn't live my comedy life by it. As was previously
stated in this thread, there are too many organic factors that a program can't
account for… But for me, and to be redundant redundant [sic], I would only
use it as a guideline. (Hardwick)
Thus the relationship between art and craft, even for comedians, is a tenuous one.
Comedians must craft their work at some level. They must get the crowd to laugh at their
jokes in order to get booked for other shows. The economics of this fact cannot be
ignored. The art of comedy, as Hardwick contends, only makes sense in a balance with
some kind of system to understand it, whether that be in a quantifiable idea of laughter or
in a universal formula for joke structure. Likewise, in moving forward to consider how
these comedic strategies can inform the way we think about the composition classroom
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we should be wary of strategies that declare allegiance to either comedy as purely art or
comedy as purely craft. This is to say a formula for comedy, similar to the kind of
formulaic rules for academic writing, ultimately provide a deficient model for invention
on their own while still maintaining a necessary function in the larger scheme of the
comedic/writing process.

Platonic Approaches to Comedic Invention Part Two: Developing a Point of View
In a separate but complementary approach to comedic writing, the genesis of
humor is thought to come from a person’s individual insights and the distillation of those
insights in order to gain perspective of some essential truth that they can use to develop
their set. Sometimes this model is described in terms of a character, in that the comedian
needs to work on finding their true inner “comedian” in order to find the material for
comedy. Other times this insight is described through references to a universal truth, such
as in popular adages such as “comedy is truth and pain” or “truth in comedy.” In any
case, these approaches to writing comedy direct the writer to look for some inner origin
through which they might employ comedy as a way to express their authentic message.
In stand-up this model often manifests in terms of the comedian’s point of view,
the comedic “essence” that keeps their work from becoming contrived. Since stand-up
comedy in particular puts so much emphasis on the lone performer on stage, this essential
truth is often thought to reside in the comedian’s essential self. In a sub-section of Paul
Ryan’s The Art of Comedy entitled “How Do I Find the Funny in Me?” Ryan explains,
I believe that every comedy actor has his or her own comedic core….In my
philosophy, the process of finding your comedic core is like peeling an onion.

49

Deep inside each of us is a sweet, juicy, innocent core, but over the years we’ve
added a bunch of additional layers to protect us. As a result, when you study
comedy acting, you need to open and peel back the layers, one by one, to reveal
your playful, funny core. (Ryan xviii-xix)
As hokey as Ryan’s onion metaphor might seem, this idea of removing the false
“outer” consciousness in order to reveal some kind of transcendent “inner” core is
pervasive in the discourse on comedy. Dean’s previously referenced Step by Step Guide
to Stand-Up Comedy, for example, uses the metaphor of comedians as “joke prospectors”
who require a “joke map” to navigate their inner “joke mine” before they use another set
of tools to “polish [their] gems” (Dean v). And when asked about how to avoid merely
imitating one’s comedic influences, Jerry Seinfeld has stated that “It’s pretty hard to
avoid when you’re just starting, but if you stay with it long enough, that will fall away
and you will emerge out of it. That’s the goal—to become yourself” (Ajaye 199, my
emphasis). In this same vein, Ellen Degeneres describes the difficulty of writing early on
in her career as directly related to her self-knowledge: “in the beginning, you buy bleach
at the store, you go, What’s funny about cleaning solvents? You’re going crazy with
anything. That’s how I wrote constantly…I’m nothing like that now. I had no idea who I
was yet” (Ajaye 93-94).
In Comic Insights: The Art of Stand Up Comedy, author and comedian Franklin
Ajaye builds a case for finding and maintaining a true point of view as the foundational
strategy for comedic invention. Early in the text, Ajaye describes the base of comedy as
“the voice you hear when you talk to yourself” and goes on to say that “As a stand-up,
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tapping into how you really feel or think is the key to tapping into your true sense of
humor. That is, if you have one” (Ajaye 11). He proceeds by describing his personal
method of “listening to himself” and outlines a set of usable tools for the prospective
comedian to “unlock his or her true comedic essence” (Ajaye xv).
In this formation, comedy is not only able to deal with what is true, but the
audience laughs precisely because it has hit upon some underlying truth that exists in the
comedian. This truth is characterized by its transcendence of any particular situation or
historical moment. Consequently Ajaye advises comedians writing “from within” to “be
resolute. Originality is never embraced as quickly as the commonplace” (12). In other
words, humor does not come from a relationship between the comedian and the audience,
but between the comedian and his/her self. A comedian adopting this model would use
the same comedic “essence” for writing a joke about the latest celebrity gossip as writing
a joke about the holocaust. If the audience doesn’t laugh, it’s either because the comedian
hasn’t explored their essential “funny bone” to the necessary extent, or because the
audience is resistant to the comedian’s “original” form of truth.
Thinking back to the various models of invention, this internalized approach
contains a strong likeness to the other aspect of Plato’s inventional paradigm, wherein the
speaker finds the truth by steering the two inner forces of passion and reason. Essentially,
just like in Plato’s ideal method, the comedian is meant to sense the truth within
him/herself in terms of laughter, and then rationally contemplate how to best portray that
truth and consequently make an audience laugh. To this end, Ajaye offers what he calls
the “third eye” technique, which represents the same kind of objective distance as the
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driver of the chariot in Plato’s chariot metaphor. Ajaye describes the technique as “a
strange combination of detachment and heightened awareness that keeps you somewhat
removed from a situation so that you can observe and record your thoughts and reactions”
(23). This kind of “heightened awareness” frames comedy as a rational process of not
only noting one’s emotions, but understanding them to the point where they can
transcend any one time or place.
Implicit in this idea of internalized comedic invention is that this comedic essence
is an innate ability, something that already exists within the comedian before s/he starts to
write a joke. From the perspective of Scott Sedita’s The Eight Characters of Comedy,
“It’s like any other skill or craft. You need to have a physical gift to play basketball, a
good ear to play the violin or a keen mind to be a mathematician. You need to have a
Funny Gene in order to do a half hour of comedy” (2). In this light there are some people
who are naturally gifted to be funny, and there are those who are not. This “Funny Gene”
we should notice, is not only internalized, but is packaged in a biological metaphor, and
this internalized mode of comedic invention often bears the mark of naturalized
metaphors such as the concept of a person’s “funny bone” or their individual “sense” of
humor. This kernel can be grown and developed over time, but it is not something that an
aspiring comedian can manufacture for himself or herself. It must exist prior to the start
of comedic writing.
This approach to invention therefore leads to the depiction of the comedian
writing in solitude, trying to get away from the distractions of the everyday in order to
develop their “comedic core.” For instance Seinfeld describes his writing process as
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follows: “I sit there and I don’t allow my mind to have any distractions—no phone, no
music, no television—my mind will eventually start to work on its own…I isolate
myself—‘cause this is my ‘sit’ time” (Ajaye 197). The truth that the comedian is meant to
find is thus specifically his or her truth and no one else’s, which serves two major
functions for the individual comedian. First, it seemingly makes it far more difficult to
steal jokes, as “The hacks can steal your joke, but they can’t steal the way you look at
life” (Ajaye 11). Second, this model privileges the power of the individual comedian
through the idea that all good comedic material is originally produced.
The difficulty of this inventional mode is that comedians are quick to admit that
they were inspired by the work of other comedians, which is a fact that would directly
contradict a self-centered comedic practice. In the logic of internalized comedic invention
the comedian would seem to be forced to either purge their comedic influences or elude
them, neither of which mesh with a reasonable definition of the comedic process. Ajaye
accordingly devotes a fair share of Comic Insights to a discussion of the difference
between being influenced and being inspired, and this delineation, I argue, can help
situate the relationship between the process of internalized comedic invention and the
formulaic strategies presented earlier.
In order to get around the logic that comedians learn by watching other
comedians, Ajaye delineates between the operation of comedic influence and comedic
inspiration. While Ajaye attributes a certain kind of power to the way a comedian is
influenced, he stresses the need “to coolly appraise a comedian’s techniques, strengths,
and weaknesses to notice what works and doesn’t work so that you can dispel any sense
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of awe and be more objective” (3). In the division between awe and objectivity and
especially in his use of the word technique, we can begin to sense what Ajaye is up to
here, but the distinction is even clearer when he talks about the influence of his idols on
his own career. Ajaye states, “The greatest gift that I received from my main comedic
influences (Richard Pryor, Robert Klein, and George Carlin) was their excellence in their
craft” (5, my emphasis). The difference between being influenced and being inspired, we
can see, hinges on the relationship between comedy as an art and comedy as a craft. The
skills learned from watching other comedians are recognized as the craft of comedy, or in
other words the kinds of formulaic strategies described earlier. But while Ajaye might
contend that these influences can help a comedian hone their craft, it takes true
inspiration, in the expression of a point of view, which enables comedy as art.
Formulaic and internalized methods of invention are therefore not surprisingly
conceived to complement one another. The internalized strategies can be considered
epistemological, but have no relation to an audience, and the formulaic strategies have a
relationship to an (exceedingly decontextualized) audience, but not are not
epistemological. The two methods are essentially constructed to work in tandem as two
stages of one platonic process; the comedian finds the “truth” of some facet of life, and
then develops it into a joke by brushing that truth up against a set of rote joke structures
and comedic principles.

Jay Leno, Janeane Garofalo, and the Spectrum of Platonic Comedic Processes
Considering that the formulaic approaches and internalized approaches to
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invention work so well in tandem, it would not be prudent to characterize any one
comedian as a holistic representation of either method in isolation. Even a comedian with
the most formulaic approach will recognize that laughter has to have some cognitive
impact on the audience, and even the comedian that works off access to the truth must
write that truth in a way that the audience will understand. It is to this end I present the
cases of Jay Leno and Janeane Garofalo, more as a way to identify extreme cases of the
two platonic inventional modes than to claim that either can be fully characterized within
either mode. Moreover, their cases represent a key defect in using platonic inventional
schemes to describe comedic practice, as the majority of comedians tend to avoid the
archetypes of public pawn and politicized prophet that Leno and Garofalo come to
represent.
Jay Leno, given the moniker of “the mechanic” by other comedians, provides a
suitable model for the formulaic approach to comedic invention. This is not because Leno
lives by the rule of three, or blindly incorporates random sets of words into his set in
order to get a laugh, but because of his unique perspective on the purpose of stand-up
comedy. For Leno, the act of writing comedy functions as a way to embellish on the
general beliefs of the audience. “The trick” claims Leno “is not to know more than
everybody else knows, it’s to know exactly what everybody else knows” (Dion and
Provenza 108, author’s emphasis). Leno then uses this form of generally accepted
knowledge as both the starting point and ending point of his jokes. For example in
explaining the comic effect of a particular joke Leno professes, “It worked because it
took them one way, then brought them back to what they sort of already knew or
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believed” (Dion and Provenza 108). This adheres to the model of formulaic approaches to
comedic invention in that the laughter of the audience is a minor embellishment on the
way people normally see the world.
On the other side of the spectrum, Janeane Garofalo’s approach to comedy
represents an inextinguishable fealty to transcendent truth, and thus sufficiently
corresponds to the internalized mode of invention. This relation is exhibited in the fact
that, more than other comedians, Garofalo claims that her comedic perspective is not just
one way of understanding the world among many, but the correct perspective in all cases.
For Garofalo, this correct perspective is rooted in the ideals of liberal politics, in that
“without liberals and liberal thinking, we would still own slaves and women wouldn’t
vote” (Dion and Provenza 117). Taking this line of thinking to the extreme, Garofalo
even goes so far as to claim “if you look up ‘liberal’ in the dictionary, it means tolerant
and open and progressive. ‘Conservative’ means an adherence to tradition, and—I would
add to that—fear of change….you have to be a certain type of person to be on the Right.”
(Dion and Provenza 117).
For Garofalo, this ideological perspective acts not only as byproduct of her comic
work, but as the driving force behind it. Garofalo thus takes every available opportunity
to defend liberal politics, to the extent that her role as a comedian often blurs with her
role as a political pundit. In this logic, Garofalo has appeared as a political pundit on
CNN and Fox News to represent the liberal position on subjects such as the war in Iraq,
often as a straw (wo)man to be mocked and marginalized. But even when accused of
playing right into the conservative’s hands, Garofalo argued, “I didn’t know what else to
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do. I didn’t know what else to do. I could see this freight train headed toward a wall. And
I don’t say that from a position of arrogance. Any thoughtful idiot could see the war was
a bad idea” (Dion and Provenza 114). Her access to the “truth” about the Iraq war is thus
both universal, since she supposes it to be such a plain realization, and personal, since
this insight is what gave her the impetus to act. This is Garofalo’s “comedic core,” the
essential quality that she writes material from in order to build a set of material.
Initially, there seems to be little to no connection between the invention strategies
of Leno and Garofalo. Whereas Leno’s comedic aims are to challenge the audience’s
views as little as possible, Garofalo’s goals are to advance the correct perception of the
world at all costs. However, both approaches have been critiqued by others in the comedy
community in recent years. For Leno, the rift between himself and the comedy
community was made most public during the conflict over The Tonight Show with then
host Conan O’Brien. “Comedians who don't like Jay Leno now, and I'm one of them,”
described notable comedian Patton Oswalt, “we're not like, 'Jay Leno sucks;' it's that
we're so hurt and disappointed that one of the best comedians of our generation...
willfully has shut the switch off” (“Like Nixon”).
The controversy surrounding Garofalo, meanwhile, came as a result of her
depiction as a “self-important leftie libral drone” (Kettle) in Matt Stone and Trey Parker’s
Team America: World Police. Garofalo took great offense to the movie claiming that she
should not be made into the subject of ridicule based on the fact that her comedic targets
were morally justified. According to Garofalo in one interview, “I was mocked for saying
‘I don’t believe there are weapons of mass destruction. We’re being lied to.’ And then I
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had my head blown off to cheers in the audience…how else would I say it? Everything I
said turned out to be exactly correct” (Provenza and Dion 115).
Essentially what these criticisms arrive at is the connection between the invention
of comedy and its epistemological capacity. Based on the resistance to Leno’s disposition
of “preaching to the converted” it is clear that comedians want comedy to achieve more
than to simply reinforce what the audience already believes. However, through the
caricature of Garofalo’s strict liberal agenda, the comedy community demonstrates the
need to ridicule not just objectively false truths, but any stable truth. The question
remains, if comedy is neither a completely vacuous ornament to serious discourse, nor
the window to some deeply embedded transcendent truth, how else can comedians
conceive of their epistemological direction? To this end, it is necessary to transition to a
third sense of comedic invention.

The Satirical Imperative: An Aristotelian Approach to Comedic Invention
Between the artistically empty gesture of comedic formulas and the pretentious
defense of the political truth is the inventional strategy that uses comedy as an argument.
All forms of comedy, one could say, make an argument for a different way to understand
the world, whether they call for an understanding of the absurdity of everyday life or a
flaw in the logic of the latest political campaign. This method puts the audience at the
center of the discussion of how to write material, as a good argument is one that
effectively persuades the audience to laugh. Laughter then functions as a sign of the
audience’s agreement with the comedian, that audience both comprehends the argument
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and realizes its validity. There is thus much at stake in the concept of humor as an
argument, as it not only provides the role of the comedian with some level of
epistemological power, but also describes chaos of comedic interaction in a systematic,
useful procedure.
The concept of satire proves to be a common way for comedians to think about
their writing within this argumentative framework, as the goal of satire has much to do
with some kind of objective. For example, in one interview Bob Odenkirk, widely
respected in the comedy community for his work on the HBO series Mr. Show, explains
the difference between satire and parody through the idea that “satire makes a point. It
exaggerates to make a point or illuminate something. And ‘parody’ merely exaggerates—
usually just a form—and it doesn’t really have anything to say about it except to point to
the building blocks of whatever form that is” (Provenza and Dion 285). The phrase
“making a point” situates satire argumentatively, as the goals for writing material are to
communicate the “point” to the audience as effectively as possible.
As the interview continues, Odenkirk stresses the importance of this
argumentative style in the writing process for the HBO series: “On Mr. Show we always
had a point to make. We always asked ourselves, ‘What is the point of this sketch? Who
is this going after? What are we saying here? How does it work on a person?” (286).
This kind of thinking also weaves its way into Vorhaus’s text, as he explains “the key to
making your parodies and satires work, then, is to make sure that your target is well
understood by your audience” (73). In these sentiments, Odenkirk and Vorhaus reveal
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how the writing process for this argumentative approach to invention is based on
carefully setting the trajectory of the joke so that the audience will “get it.”
Already this system differs radically from the previous two modes of invention,
since Odenkirk’s jokes are not empty vessels for delivering a pre-set message, but are
carefully designed in order to help the audience to understand “the point.” Whereas
Ajaye’s internalized method implored the comedian/writer to hold true to their comedic
essence no matter what how the audience reacts, the argumentative jokes are constructed
with the audience in mind so as to aid the transmission of the message. According to
Vorhaus, “The difference between a class clown and a class nerd is that the class clown
tells jokes everyone gets while the class nerd tells jokes only he gets” (Vorhaus 7). There
is thus not only an emphasis on the comedian making a point, but on the audience
understanding that point. Jokes in this light are judged for their communicative capacity,
for what the comedian’s “point” to line up as closely as possible to the audiences
laughter.
In this emphasis on the audience, the argumentative approach works in a similar
way to Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical invention. The kind of knowledge produced
by this inventional mode is neither solely located in the common sense of the audience
nor in the exclusive awareness of the lone comedian. Instead, the epistemology of the
argumentative approach is conceived through the relationship between the audience and
speaker, a notion that bears similarity to the Aristotelian enthymeme. What’s more,
Odenkirk’s process, in its questions of “What is the point of this sketch?” and “What are
we saying here?” reveal the same privileging of rationality that the Aristotelian system.
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Humor is meant to have a logical, understandable “point.” The emotional content of a
sketch or a joke, or in other words the questions of what the audience is supposed to feel,
relegated to an accessory of what the audience is supposed to think.
Odenkirk makes another important distinction between this mode of invention and
Ajaye’s in discussing the message his satire attempts to convey. “I think that political
points are not really worthwhile. To say, ‘Our side is right, their side is wrong’ is not
really worth much. The real point is to try to get behind the story” (287, author’s
emphasis). Recalling Garofalo, the internalized method of invention resulted in the very
right/wrong binary that Odenkirk is distancing himself from, instead trying to gain a new
perspective of the usual conflicts.
Patton Oswalt, in his own description of satire, helps frame what Odenkirk might
have meant by claiming to get “behind” the story. Oswalt claims, “I like it better when
you embrace what you can’t stand to the point where you strangle it: ‘Let’s let this
horrible thing flourish. Let’s see what would happen if this thing grew with no
boundaries and no restrictions, and see where this takes us.’ That’s what the best satire
does” (Dion and Provenza 143). Read through this discussion, satire can be said to be
“behind” the story in two senses. First, the goal is to illuminate some perspective that the
audience had not previously considered, thus being more “behind the scenes” if you will.
Secondly, Odenkirk might say that he is “behind” the story in terms of supporting it to
the role of idiocy, following the propositions to the logical conclusion to demonstrate
their ridiculous quality.
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This ethic away from polemics serves an important function not only for
Odenkirk, but for the majority of the comedy community, especially for those who regard
their work as satirical. The idea is not to defend a single position, but to actively dislodge
whatever position happens to play the dominant role in society. Todd Hanson, a longtime writer for the satirical publication The Onion, puts it this way: “it’s not that you
ridicule things that are deserving of ridicule. It’s broader than that….no matter what
you’re talking about, if it involves the human condition, there’s something in there that
deserves to be ridiculed” (Dion and Provenza 279). Here we see the epistemological
goals of this particular mode of comedic invention at their clearest all things being
constantly ridiculed, all things being constantly subverted.
This mode for comedic invention, then, bears an uncanny resemblance to Berlin’s
goals for social epistemic rhetoric. The disposition of the satirist is to begin writing from
the point of view of revealing some sense of ideology in the audience through laughter.
Though the discussion on comedy is less slanted toward pedagogy than Berlin’s model, it
is clear that there is some kind of underlying ethic or at very least an altruistic tone in this
comedic outlook similar to Berlin’s hope for liberated student subjectivity. Dan Dion and
Paul Provenza claim as much in the introduction to their book Satiristas, saying
“[comedians] use their powers for good, not evil. They will trick you, but only into
thinking things you may not want to. They will surprise you, but with realizations. They
may lure you into ideological territories you didn’t expect to be in” (xvi). Like Berlin’s
cultural studies model, we can clearly see that Dion and Provenza’s attempt to justify
satire falls prey to the very right/wrong polemics that the comedians themselves stay
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away from, as the hope that comedians only use their “powers” for “good” implies that
that sense of “good” is not itself open to satirical breakdown.
The most blatant connection between satire and social epistemic rhetoric,
however, arrives later in the same paragraph, when Dion and Provenza claim that
“[Comedians] may lie to the audience, but not to hide anything. If they lie, it is to reveal
some greater truth about us all and the world we live in” (xvi). Like cultural studies, the
recognition of ideology through satire is thought here to give the comedian objective
mental powers, the ability to reveal the “greater truth” for the powers of “good.”
In subtle ways, many comedians have picked up on this logical progression, and
become reluctant to label themselves as satirists or likewise make claims to actively
inciting social change. When asked if their ideas were able to accomplish more than just
being funny, these comedians often speak of satire as a by-product of their act, rather
than as a foundational impetus for invention. For example, Kevin McDonald, member of
the notable comedy group The Kids in the Hall, states, “It’s usually bad if we think ‘Oh,
we wanna blow this up.’ But if we come up with an idea, and later someone tells us what
we were blowing up, then we go ‘Oh, I guess that’s what it was!’ But the comedy idea
comes first” (Dion and Provenza 247). This case for comedy without an argument finds
another advocate in the words of Conan O’Brien: “I think comedy needs to be natural. It
needs to come from the desire to just make people laugh. The biggest danger in comedy
is trying to inflate it or give it an importance of any kind” (55, author’s emphasis).
Yet the most surprising voice urging distance from a satirical imperative to
constantly undermine solidified value systems is that of Steven Colbert. Colbert’s show,
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The Colbert Report, is often considered to be the paramount example of modern
American satire, and Colbert’s character might easily be deemed a perfect caricature of
the right-wing political pundit. Colbert’s show and character represent an incredible
amount of cultural influence in the United States, with Time going as far as to call
Colbert’s performance at the White House Correspondent’s Dinner as “the politicalcultural touchstone issue of 2006” (Poniewozik). But despite Colbert’s widespread
characterization as the satirist of our time, his opinion, like Obrien’s, is that comedy
begins with laughter and nothing else. Colbert claims:
I think when we do the show well, or when I do my job well, on some level it
reflects honest, passionately held beliefs. Now, could those influence people?
They could. But I’m not doing it to do so, and I’m not expecting it to. I don’t feel
like it’s a failure if it doesn’t. If somebody tells me that I influenced them, it’s not
for me to say they’re wrong, but that’s not my goal and it’s not the definition of
my success. I’m out for laughs. When people came up to me after the White
House Correspondent’s Dinner and said ‘Fuck those people, man. What does it
matter if they laugh?’ I was, like, ‘No, it kind of matters to me. (Dion and
Provenza 27)
Clearly, the concept of satire (and by extension the inventional strategy of rational
argument) plays an important role in comedy, in that unlike the platonic modes of
invention, it offers a way of conceiving humor that directly impacts epistemology. Satire
also provides a kind of loose ethical motivation for humor, as the tool of argumentation
allows comedians to reveal what goes on “behind” the usual polemics. However, despite
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these features, we can see that a model of humor conceived as an argument tends to
attribute comedians with the power to disrupt any kind of ideological structure at will,
which both exaggerates the cultural power of satire and imposes a kind of responsibility
on the comedian to produce critical perspectives in their audience. To put it another way,
in establishing one’s self as a satirist, a comedian ties his or her material to a literary
tradition of great minds, including the likes of Jonathan Swift and Mark Twain, but the
very act of being included in this tradition limits the primary goal of the comedian, that of
laughter. To this end, the fourth and final mode of comedic invention regards laughter as
the irreplaceable starting point and end goal for comedic practice.

Jokes without Punchlines: Toward a Sophistic Model of Comedic Invention
Comedian Steve Martin’s first “real” performance was at a music club called The
Prison of Socrates. Martin had been performing regularly for a stage show at Knott’s
Berry Farm for the past three years, but the act had largely consisted of “juggling, a few
standard magic routines, a banjo song, and some very old jokes” (Born Standing Up 65).
These short performances wouldn’t fill the twenty minute time slot that Martin was
scheduled to do at The Prison of Socrates, and so, for the first time in his life, Martin was
forced to create original material. According to Martin, “This realization mortified me. I
did not know how to write comedy—at all…after several years of working up my weak
twenty minutes, I was now starting from almost zero” (73).
And so Martin began his search for comedic inspiration, trying out a set of
inventional methods for comedy vaguely similar to those described thus far. He looked at
conventional methods of building jokes in terms of setups and punchlines, but ultimately
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could not bring himself to write that way. Martin claims, “What bothered me about this
formula was the nature of the laugh it inspired, a vocal acknowledgement that a joke had
been told, like automatic applause at the end of a song” (“Being Funny”). Martin
subsequently tried a range of other techniques in order to develop material. He tried to
develop his individual “sense” of humor. He started listening to comedy records in order
to get a feel for the rhythms of comedy. He even tried, rather unsuccessfully, to employ
radical tactics like reading poetry on stage, e.e. cummings or T.S. Eliot, in order to
awaken some sense of comedy that achieved what he was looking for.
But where Martin professes to have first felt the pangs of “comic inspiration” was
not some activity devoted to finding his “inner funny,” or to targeting some source of
power to be subverted, but in a class on semantics he took while studying philosophy at
California State University, Long Beach. Specifically, Martin remembers being
particularly struck by the syllogisms of Lewis Carroll, one being:
1) Babies are illogical
2) No one is despised who can manage a crocodile
3) Illogical persons are despised
____________________________________
Therefore: Babies cannot manage crocodiles
Martin claims that “these word games bothered and intrigued me. Appearing to be
silly nonsense, on examination they were absolutely logical –yet they were still funny”
(Born Standing Up 75). Though Martin had been trained as a performer in his time at
Knott’s Berry Farm, and trained as a philosopher in his classes on ethics and
metaphysics, it was this moment that galvanized Martin’s approach to comedy for the rest
of his career. The appeal wasn’t that Carroll’s logical system could be subverted, or that
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the absurdity of the proof was something to be questioned, but that the absurdity of truth
itself should be celebrated as an origin of comedic practice. To put this into practice,
Martin tried to develop a set of jokes without punchlines, jokes that allowed the comedic
tension to build, but never any kind of comedic release. “If I kept denying them the
formality of a punchline,” Martin claims “the audience would eventually pick their own
place to laugh, essentially out of desperation. This type of laugh seemed stronger to me,
as they would be laughing at something they chose, rather than being told exactly when to
laugh” (“Being Funny,” author’s emphasis).
I argue that this sense of laughter, the laughter as activated in the audience, is
what makes this mode of invention so redemptive in the face of ideological tensions. In
the previous invention strategies, the conversation on laughter was focused on the
comedian’s sense of agency, that they could force the audience to laugh at specific times,
and for specific reasons. Because of that sense of control, the comedian in those
frameworks is essentially given a choice between reinforcing and challenging the
audience’s perspective. The audience’s laughter, in turn, became only a mechanism for
demonstrating how well these perspectives were being reinforced or challenged. But in
Martin’s method of jokes without punchlines he refuses a sense of comedic agency, and
thus allows laughter to become a function of the situation itself. The comedian isn’t
charged with writing jokes, but instead with creating a situation with enough tension for
the audience to break down into laughter.
This laughter via the situation hearkens back to the sophistic appraisal of kairos,
the sort of extra-logical force that acts on a person to speak. Karios, we should recall,
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works beyond the distinction between emotional and logical appeals, since the subject
does not control but is rather controlled by the situation. While Martin’s jokes without
punchlines allude to this to a certain extent in the audience’s essentially “desperate”
laughter, a more compelling connection is found in Diane Davis’ Breaking Up [at]
Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter. In the book, Davis situates laughter both
epistemologically and physiologically within the field of rhetoric and composition, and
turns specifically to a sense of kairotic laughter. For Davis, “the force of kairos can dance
across the body, can instantly possess the subject and explode its boundaries/binaries of
identity” and that “these kairotic moments manifest themselves physiologically in
spontaneous generations of laughter, which, by the way, are anything but situationally
correct” (29).
To this end, there is a clear connection between the kind of kairotic laughter
suggested by Davis and the source of tension created by Martin. By refusing to deliver
the audience a punchline, Martin establishes a tension where no reaction is technically
“correct” because both an affirmative laughter (I laugh because I get the joke) or a
negative response (I get the joke but do not find it funny) are derailed in their search for a
logical “point” in the first place. When to laugh and what to laugh about are moot points
within this inventional strategy, as the audience surrenders their mind, body, and for a
moment their subjectivity to uncontrollable laughter. In Davis’s terms, “this is not the
controllable chuckle but the co(s)mic rhythm that laughs you” (29).
Nevertheless, we should not suppose that this convulsive laughter is limited to
Martin, or even to his comedic procedure of denying the audience a punchline. To do so
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would be a disservice to the long history of comedians who have encouraged
epistemological change and also used conventional joke structures, which, as I have
demonstrated, serve a vital purpose for the economic constraints of a working comedian.
Instead, this inventional strategy should be read as the tension that functions between the
setup and the punchline regardless of how long that tension may be left to germinate. It is
the tension brought on by the overflow of meaning that is rendered always already
incomplete by the retroactive desires of rational consciousness. This, we might say, is the
lifeblood of E.B. White’s ex-frog. The possibility for kairotic laughter is thus inscribed in
the practices of a multitude of comedians, even those I have used to represent the other
modes of invention; however, this laughter is not brought on by their formulaic, internal,
and argumentative process, but as a radical excess to their active intentions and effects.
Martin’s method of jokes without punchlines, then, should be understood as a particularly
fitting example of this inventional strategy, rather than as the exclusive model for its
employment.
Another consequence of this sense of inventive tension is the way it alters the
relationship between comedian and audience. In the previous modes of invention,
laughter functioned unidirectionally from the comedian to the audience. The comedian
speaks; the audience laughs. But in a non-rational inventive mode laughter is let loose to
function through the situation, leaving the possibility that the comedian on stage might
break down into laughter, unable to resist the non-rational force. In these circumstances,
the very performance of comedian as a comedian ruptures to display the entertainer’s
own inadequacy to make meaning. Though such a scene might not satisfy an audience, it
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represents the way kairotic laughter is instigated less by one individual than by the
situation itself.
I recognize that the very mention of the word tension might persuade some
readers to expect this inventional strategy to fall safely within the boundaries of the relief
theory of humor, wherein laughter is understood as the release of some source of built up
cognitive, emotional, or cultural tension. But, as is usually the case with theories of
humor as relief, the question becomes: a relief from what? Without reference to the
comedian’s guiding punchline to direct laughter to a specific time and toward a specific
meaning, the audience’s response proves too fragmented to constitute a relief from any
particular cultural or political tension. If we can say that this style of invention is to
relieve the audience of anything, it is to relieve them from the very catharsis of the
comedian’s punchline, from a satiric and platonic possibility of eliminating tension in the
first place; it is the relief, so to speak, from relief itself. It is this kind of laughter that
takes a different approach to cynicism, and thus becomes the key consideration of
comedy that will help us to return to the issue of cynicism in the composition classroom
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PEDAGOGY AND LAUGHTER: AUDITING THE LIMITS OF MEANING

There is a substantial fear, or perhaps skepticism, that thrives at the intersection of
pedagogy and humor. In part, this fear is bred out of the lack of theoretical guidelines for
thinking about the comedic process as a writing process. Accordingly, my goal thus far
has been to illustrate some of the connective tissue between models of writing and
models of comedy through the canon of invention. From these illustrations it should be
clear that comedians can and will describe their process using a variety of classical
approaches to invention, from Plato, to Aristotle, to the Sophists, and even combinations
of all three. But while all of the inventional approaches I’ve described can correspond to
comedic practice, the sophistic concept of inventive kairos is the only approach that can
reasonably account for laughter as the non-rational physiological seizure that it is, and is
therefore the most generative point of contact between pedagogy and humor. These
connections thus enable us to move back to the composition classroom in order to discuss
the issue of cynical student subjectivities, and to proceed from descriptions of comedic
practice to implications of those practices in an ideologically-minded classroom.

Comedic Pedagogy through Formulas: The Limitations of Clarity
A pedagogical scheme based on formulaic approaches to comedic invention
would be structured around teaching students to demonstrate the proper knowledge of a
well-defined set of comedic rules. The form of the jokes would take precedent, as
students would replicate classic joke structures such as the rule of three as a kind of
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universal technique for writing comedy. The goal of this use of humor in the classroom,
however, would be less about writing independent jokes than to learn the techniques of
humor in order to apply them to academic writing. Humor would be put to the task of
“attention getters” such as topic sentences and titles, but would rarely be designed as
anything more than a decoration of the serious writing within.
In order to set up this humor in service to seriousness, the teacher would need to
make a clear distinction between a kind of humor designed to bring the audience to
convulsive laughter and the kind of humor designed to amuse the reader with a knowing
smile. Laughter is inherently disruptive, shaking the reader mentally and physically, and
such a distraction would not be welcome in the highly structured writing in this
pedagogy. Instead, the teacher would advise students to disrupt the tone and style of the
writing as little as possible, and would frame humor as a way to raise the reader’s level of
interest. The teacher might even echo the words of the aforementioned Jasheway,
claiming that the “purpose is to grab the reader’s attention and help you make points in
creative ways. Don’t confuse the reader by coming across as a comedian” (49). The class
would privilege humor only in service to a clear, concise academic prose, in order to
more efficiently transmit the written message.
In the wake of appeals to amusement and clarity, it is no coincidence that this
classroom would also purport itself to be ideologically neutral. In order to cause the least
distraction possible from the (serious) text, humor would have to match seemingly
universal joke structures with seemingly universal content. Students would be forced to
abandon all but the most generalized cultural and political references in the interest of
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allowing for the largest possible audience to be “in” on the joke. In line with Leno’s
approach to invention, students would be asked “not to know more than everybody else
knows, it’s to know exactly what everybody else knows” (Dion and Provenza 108,
author’s emphasis). This kind of knowing would therefore align with the dominant way
of speaking, writing, and thinking about the world: the dominant ideology.
It is important to note that from the teacher’s perspective the class would not be
ideological at all, as the explicit goal of the class would be to teach a set of comedic
principles which could be applied to any set of content. However, this contention is built
on the assumption that ideological neutrality is possible in the first place, an assumption
which conflicts with Therbon’s definition of ideology as a function of conscious thought
itself. The kind of depoliticized clarity that would be celebrated by the teacher would
therefore camouflage its ideological construction under the auspices of simple common
sense. Politicians are corrupt. Coursework is tedious. Hitler was evil. These forms of
common ground would give student-writers the content to insert into these comic
formulas, remaining ever-mindful of the commitment to clarity. Such is the content of
Leno’s late-night monologues, and such is the dynamic of a classroom devoted to humor
through a formulaic approach to invention.
There are a number of limitations to this pedagogical system, the most obvious
being that the dominant perspective, either in terms of the structure or content of a joke,
isn’t always the most desirable to use in the classroom. No matter how generalized a
topic or premise might seem, it is always grounded in cultural and historical
contingencies that render the universal premise or the universal comedic structure utterly
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impossible. Even the most generalized subject matter, say, airline travel, will relate to a
reader in different ways depending on whether s/he has flown on a plane, how often, and
other social and cultural factors. Moreover, subject matter built on “common sense” gives
way to humor based on broad stereotypes and insensitivity. It is no coincidence that some
of the most ignorant and gruesome forms of humor are combined with the most
innocuous joke structures (for example: blonde jokes, dead baby jokes). Supposing the
form or content of a joke to be ideologically neutral is not only to marginalize other ways
of seeing the world, but to naturalize that marginalization as a celebration of a clearer
way of constructing reality.
Similarly, the proposed universal structures for humor, such as the consonant
principle and the rule of three, are also laden with cultural and political value. This is
easy to locate in the consonant principle, as the list of “automatically” funny words
includes the likes of “didgeridoo,” “Shih Tzu,” and other terms that signify cultural
difference (Appendix A). It is clear that these terms are only funny insomuch as they are
positioned as the strange other to the “normal” words. Though initially less obvious, the
rule of three is also driven by a set of contingent value systems. At the heart of the triplet
structure of the rule of three is a kind of comedic efficiency, the will to develop as many
punchlines as possible in the shortest amount of time. As a consequence, humor
developed through the three part formula marginalizes alternate ways of thinking about
joke structures, such as a kind of long-form narrative that could be said to blend setup
and anticipation, or which builds a punchline as the setup for another joke.
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As the applications of the humor become increasingly complex, the rule of three
loses its value as a universal descriptive device. Much like the common structure of the
five paragraph essay in contemporary composition, the three part joke structure has only
a limited function as a pedagogical tool, and any attempt at using humor in an authentic
context requires an understanding of not only how to use that tool to write comically, but
an understanding of the appropriate situation for the tool to be used. However, the
tendency toward abstract clarity would discourage situated knowledge in the name of
repeatable, universal formulas. This would prove limiting because it would disable
students from being able adapt humor, with respect to either form or content, to new
concepts and situations.
All of this is not to say that the mere presence of comedic formulas inspires
students to become mindless cogs to the dominant culture, but that the denial of any
ideological substance in humor naturalizes whatever ideological structures are at work in
the classroom. Furthermore, while the teacher would claim to evaluate writing as an
objective evaluation of the correct use of comedic formulas, appeals to ideological
neutrality would obscure the teacher’s role in establishing what “clarity” means with
respect to writing with humor. The teacher decides whether certain jokes are broad
enough to reach a general audience, or if the perspective of the joke adequately adheres to
common sense reasoning. No matter how objectively a teacher might try to think about
broad jokes, his or her mental library of references will only be able to cover a limited
number of perspectives, meaning that the definition of “clarity” would change from year
to year and from teacher to teacher. To this end, the structure and content of student
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comedy would be limited to the teacher’s knowledge and beliefs as each student would
try to appeal to the abstract idea of the clear, attention-inducing joke.

Comedic Pedagogy of Self Expression: The Limitations of Authentic(ated) Humor
While formula-based pedagogies rely on strict adherence to comedic structures in
order to teach and evaluate humor, those formulas marginalize students whose
perspectives do not reflect those of the teacher. The internalized approach to comedic
invention seeks to overcome this limitation by framing the concept of humor around each
student’s individual voice. In this classroom, students would be encouraged to look for
their independent comedic perspective, some kind of internal core from which they could
express their individual sense of humor. The course would be devoted to helping students
understand the difference between being influenced by others and being inspired by
tapping into their comedic core.
In class, students would read, watch, and listen to the work of famous comedians
in order to separate derivative comedic techniques from the expression of a comedic core.
Students would then be advised to develop an internal comedic essence based on true,
original comedic premises rather than false, derivative ones. This distinction would come
from students reflecting independently on moments of their own laughter, regarding those
moments to have hit upon some essential truth. Once in-focus, students would then
concentrate on their essence to the point where it would transcend any particular audience
or situation. Following the mindset of Ajaye, the student-comedian would focus on his or
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her own laughter until the point where “the joy and vividness is communicated to the
audience, and enjoyment becomes infectious” (16).
The goal of this pedagogical system would be to empower individual students by
giving them a sense of agency independent of social pressure. Proponents of teaching
comedy this way would claim that since the classroom is focused on the individual,
students would be free to challenge the dominant ideology if their laughter pointed them
to do so. This pedagogy would still put emphasize a sense of clarity, but the primary
concern would shift to an appeal to authenticity, to the student’s presentation of their
“real” comedic essence. Unlike a formulaic approach to comedic pedagogy, the students
would be urged to express this comedic essence regardless of how those views might
conflict with the values of a general audience. The teacher, again calling on the same
logic as Ajaye, would tell the students to “be resolute. Originality is never embraced as
quickly as the commonplace” (12). In this move, it would appear that the student views
that were marginalized by the formulaic approach would be allowed to flourish by
addressing the individual student’s voice. Students would also be invited to write this
material through a wider array of comedic formats, from the aforementioned three part
joke structure, to long-form narratives, or even forms of visual humor. As long as the
student could connect their humor to an authentic voice, s/he would be given freedom to
work with content and structure.
Ultimately, however, the internalized mode of comedic invention exchanges
fealty to a transcendent “common sense” with fealty to a transcendent, personalized
“sense” of humor. Just as a strict set of comedic forms give way to the dominant ideology
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as defined by an abstract appeal to clarity, an internally focused pedagogical system gives
way to a solidified ideological perspective though individualized authenticity. Students
would be assured that if they can only recognize the false premises in their beliefs, and
shed those premises, they will come closer to their true comedic perspective and thus the
correct ideology. Similar to a pedagogy based on comedic formulas, this internalized
comedic essence is also conceived prior to an audience, and develops into a set of
comedic material meant to be function in any situation.
This appeal to authenticity, however, conceals how the teacher’s authority
disables any real form of student empowerment in this pedagogy. Lester Faigley claims
as much in “Judging Writing, Judging Selves,” in which he considers how composition
teachers have historically equated good writing with the presence of an authentic voice.
Through the course of the essay, Faigley inspects a number of writing samples that
teachers have deemed “authentic,” and highlights the ways that these examples are built
upon the assumption that the internal “self” of the student can be communicated.
Moreover, Faigley contends that an appeal to authentic voice “hides the fact that these
same students will be judged by the teacher’s unstated cultural definitions of the self”
(410). These “unstated cultural definitions of the self” could materialize in any number of
ways in comedic invention. The teacher might see long-form anecdotal comedy like
Patton Oswalt to represent the best “true” voice, or instead favor the self-deprecating oneliners of Rodney Dangerfield. The teacher might see a Seinfeld-ian comedic “essence” as
a wonderful example of a quirky voice, or see that same style as too distant from the
material to be labeled authentic. Just as the teacher’s definition of clarity determines how
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students conceive of comedic formulas, the definition of an authentic comedic essence is
ultimately a reflection of the teacher’s desire for a specific production of the student as
independent and empowered. Therefore, not only would this pedagogy fail to produce an
independent student subject, but its failure would be drowned out by clamor of its own
victory march.
Such is the risk of approaches like Bev Hogue’s “I’m Not Making This Up:
Taking Humor Seriously in the Creative Nonfiction Classroom,” which attempts to
“overcome student’s reluctance to take humor seriously” through emphasis on “the use of
humor as a tool for making arguments and conveying information” (202). Students in
Hogue’s classroom read formative pieces of nonfiction humor and perform rhetorical
analysis on those pieces, “examining style, structure, content, purpose, and audience
appeal and drawing conclusions about specific ingredients from which the author cooks
up humor” (203). Hogue assigns the students to write constantly using humor,
culminating in a handful of polished samples to be turned in as a final portfolio of their
work (204). The most important of these assignments is a research-driven piece of nonfiction, meant to remind students of the seriousness of humor and “requiring the ability to
play around with words, form, and content without leaving behind the world of hard, cold
fact” (204).
Hogue’s method assumes a number of benefits for incorporating humor into the
classroom, from the role of humor in the literary canon, to helping students to deal with
traumatic events, to helping students to pay attention to audience response during peer
review. There are also moments where Hogue, in accordance with an internalized
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pedagogical scheme, exhibits the hope for originality and individuality in student humor.
Despite much of the student writing emerging as little more than the conventional
research paper, Hogue excitedly points to the work of a few students who “were more
adventurous, taking the sorts of risks they had observed in other authors, coloring outside
the lines to create their own new and effective forms of expression” (204). But while
Hogue’s method probably has helped her students to become better writers in some sense,
it fails to account for how that model of better writing is still dependent on her individual
preferences as the teacher, whether those preferences are aimed toward the construction
of a sentence or the construction of a joke. “Good writing” in this environment is limited
to nonfiction writing, and “good humor” is limited to the writing of Dave Barry, Barbara
Ehrenreich and David Foster Wallace.
Hogue never addresses the possibility that students might not be learning how to
write “new” or “effective” forms of humor so much as reflect her idea of what humor is
supposed to look like. After all, Hogue cannot remove herself from the power of deciding
the students’ grades, which gives the students all the more reason to design their jokes to
fit Hogue’s sense of humor. Since Hogue provides the students with a variety of
examples of what she finds to be funny, the students would simply have to draw from
those models in order to act out Hogue’s pedagogical fantasy to imbue the power of
humor upon them. From Hogue’s perspective, the students would seem to be mastering
the comic form. From the student’s perspective, the task of writing humorous nonfiction
would take on a farcical quality akin to the 1989 cult classic Weekend at Bernie’s, as they
attempt to animate the lifeless structures of humor with enough motion as to fool the
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teacher into believing their performance. The students Hogue saw as taking risks were, in
reality, the best at playing it safe, as they successfully identified and reflected the
teacher’s value of “effective” humor. I argue that this oversight represents the typical
pratfall of conflating humor and pedagogy, as it forgets both the unruly nature of humor
and the role of pedagogical desire in the classroom.
What’s more, the more that the teacher would claim to empower the students as
individual comedians, the less the students would be willing to take risks in their writing.
Students would come to associate the idea of empowerment with a sly form of further
subjugation, and would become suspicious of future calls to action as well. In essence, it
would produce a cynical student subject whose distrust of any appeal to social change
would result in an apathetic acceptance of the dominant ideology. Thinking back to the
first chapter, this sense of subjectivity would result in Zizek’s definition of cynicism of
“they know very well what they doing, but still, they are doing it” (33), and would
accordingly produce the same problematic public disinterest as described previously.
This pedagogy therefore not only fails to enable students to take ownership over their
own thoughts and feelings, but it stifles the will to resist the dominant ideology after the
students leave the classroom.
There are thus few benefits of a humor driven pedagogy that overlooks the way
the classroom inherently limits student subjectivity. If humor is to have a positive effect
on the composition classroom, it must achieve something more than to simply support to
the needs of academic writing (as found in the sole directive of comedic formulas), and
more than the symbolic gesture to an idealized independent student-comedian (as found
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in the internalized approach to comedic writing). All too often teachers incorporate
humor to this effect, only to create an atmosphere that replaces the productive risk and
tension of humor with the directive to produce comedy correctly. A composition
pedagogy that turns to humor, then, must at least acknowledge the problem of
pedagogical power, and overcome the way the classroom itself limits the possibilities for
students to explore the possibilities of comedy.

Comedic Pedagogy of Criticism: The Limitations of Satire
In light of the way the teacher’s power can translate into students performing
subjectivity, the logical turn would be to the seemingly neutral position of satire as a way
of dismantling ideology in any form. The goal of the class would be for the teacher to
induce the students to become skeptical agents of the world around them, always aware
of the ideological processes that influence their decisions. Where the previous two
pedagogical methods would depend on a stable set of techniques or a stable comedic
voice as the starting point of comedic practice, a classroom based in satire would seek
stability only in order to challenge it. Student-comedians would idealize the comedic
models found in Satiristas in which comedians “see the absurdity in everything,
everywhere, all the time. They can’t help it; it’s a curse. And when you see enough of
that, you start to get pretty skeptical about things” (Dion and Provenza xiii). By adopting
a consistently skeptical attitude, the teacher would claim that the students would be given
the agency to criticize all claims to authenticity and clarity.
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Like the other pedagogical directions, a pedagogy of satire would include an
examination of the great works of comedy, however, students would look for situated
reasons for effective comedy instead of universal ones. Through the logic of Odenkirk,
students would be taught the difference between parody and satire, and would be
constantly on the lookout for humor that only reinforces the dominant beliefs and
practices. As students would write their own humorous pieces, they would be required to
explain how their use of humor works to disrupt the dominant ideology, or in other words
how they have called the reader’s attention to the underlying assumptions that inform his
or her everyday life. Laughter would be put to work, used as a way for students to
interrupt their own social historical construction and similar constructions in others.
Part of the excitement for this pedagogy would inevitably come from the idea that
students would be made resistant to ideology in any capacity. Students could look at the
way Chris Rock’s infamous “Niggas vs. Black People” criticized dominant racial
stereotypes while simultaneously reinforcing those stereotypes. They could examine the
cultural assumptions challenged by The Daily Show, while also discussing the way the
show contains its own set of ideological assumptions. And most importantly, students
would be directed to highlight the ideology of the university, the classroom, and the
teacher, in order to subsequently use the assumptions produced by that ideology as their
own satirical fodder. Students might be asked to draw caricatures of the teacher, or to
write satirically on the tedium of general education courses like freshman composition.
This pedagogy would therefore look at humor as a consequence of the rhetorical
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situation, attempting to empower the student subject to carry the lessons of humor outside
the classroom as a method of challenging the status quo.
In putting humor to work, laughter would need to be defined in terms of a rational
response to a specific stimulus. It would not be enough to claim that the audience laughs,
as this laughter would need to be deconstructed for its ideological content. Laughter
could work as a reification of the dominant social views, as the audience laughs as if to
say “that is what I have always believed!” Likewise, laughter could also function as a
resistant uprising to the dominant social views, as if to say “I never thought about it that
way!” But in either case, the meaning of laughter would need to be strictly defined in
order to divide the laughter that calls the auditor to action from the laughter that solidifies
the auditor’s preexistent perspective of the world. Only with this distinction clearly
established would students be able to consult humor as a tool for exposing, rather than
reinforcing, the dominant ideology.
In a similar way, Langstraat’s pedagogy works to help students to constantly
situate the play of their emotional constructedness in order to bring about an active,
critical student subject. Recalling Zizek’s “they know very well what they doing, but still,
they are doing it” we might imagine that Langstraat would add a clause to the end:
“because they do not feel it.” The goal of pedagogy, in this light, is to identify emotions
and situate them culturally and historically in order to be more aware of the emotions at
play in a given situation. For example, Langstraat briefly outlines the transformation of
emotion culture from the 1920s to the 1950s, at which time “the culture grew suspicious
of any intense emotional expression that threatened self control, ‘American cool,’ an
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affective stance of restraint and containment of emotional expressivity, was born” (307).
This kind of historical account of emotions is vital to Langstraat’s paradigm.
Through these kinds of accounts about the historical trajectory of certain
emotions, as well as a (rather familiar) awareness of the play of those emotions on one’s
own subjectivity, Langstraat starts to conceive of emotions as something to be shaped and
focused in order to bring oneself to action. In fact, Langstraat advocates that we consider
emotions as actions in order to “theorize the ways in which our actions are not only
tempered by affect, but are communally and rhetorically constructed through affect”
(315). In essence, Langstraat advocates for the composition classroom to become riddled
with discussions about how students are feeling, how those feelings are socially
constructed, and the appropriate feelings for a given situation. Even cynicism, the
veritable scourge of cultural studies pedagogy, is given the possibility of being the
“valuable or appropriate affective response” for certain situations (306).
While the concept of emotional energy does not perfectly correspond with a
concept of laughter, a pedagogically driven satirical imperative would produce the same
kind of relationship between rationality and action. The ideals of satire, like Langstraat’s
considerations of emotional energy, convert feelings into a matrix of appropriate
responses. Students are to be given the power to evaluate their feelings, their laughter,
and to then be given the responsibility to enable the appropriate emotions/laughter in
their audience. Rather than one emotion or satirical perspective, students would be able to
modify their perspective to each situation, enabling the tools for critical subjectivity even
once students have left the classroom.
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Langstraat’s approach, adapted for my discussion, presents a number of valuable
advances in thinking through the intersection of humor and pedagogy. By discussing
affect outside of what she calls the “privatized individual mind,” Langstraat provides a
way to discuss laughter as an/other method to the branding and limitation of expressivist
pedagogy (305). This is to say that laughter does not give way to a pure form of truth
outside of social construction, but is instead fundamentally dependent on social and
historical factors. Likewise, in discussing the framework for these emotion-actions,
Langstraat declines to limit her theory of affect to the likes of pathetic appeals (308). This
distinction enables a similar consideration of humor which, as previously stated, yields a
problematic disposition when configured within the rhetorical triangle. These theoretical
turns have made room for greater dialogue on the effects of emotions on the public
sphere, and in those respects should be admired. However, the move to connect emotions,
and consequently laughter, to critical actions seems to simply build upon the same
idealized set of objective mental powers as other considerations of social epistemic
rhetoric, and in doing so subscribes to the same hopeful pedagogy as well.
The spirit of this hopeful pedagogy of cultural studies, either through emotional
energy or laughter, is best defined by Ann Berhoff’s Forming, Thinking, Writing: The
Composing Imagination. In the book, Berthoff explains the relationship between words
and thoughts as a dialectical process via I.A. Richard’s definition of dialectic as “an audit
of meaning.” Berthoff clarifies,
Just as a bookkeeper has to account for income and expenditures in order to
balance credits and debits, an audit of meanings would have to balance what one
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sentence has to say against what others seem to say…of course, audit also has to
do with listening. In composing, you have to be an auditor in both senses: you
have to listen on the inner dialogue, which is thinking, and you have to be able to
balance the account of what you’ve been hearing against what is set down on
paper. (47)
The ideals of pedagogy based on satire, then, bear similarity to Berlin’s model of
social epistemic rhetoric, as they put a significant emphasis on this kind of continuous
audit of meaning. By constantly auditing their ideological underpinnings, students would
be able to make a conscious decision to change their ideological perspective. A humorbased pedagogy would seek to engage this constant audit through satire, whereas
Langstraat’s model would audit a conceivably broader range of emotional energies. But
regardless of what factors are audited through these pedagogical schemes, each remains
pious to the idea that through realizing their ideological constructedness, students will be
given the power to consciously decide their ideological disposition based on the situation.
In terms of humor, student’s audit of laughter would supposedly enable them to control
their own laughter, as well as to incite appropriate moments of laughter from a given
audience.
I believe that students can be made to understand humor as a product of history,
and that, given pop-quiz of a situation and a set of responses, students would be able to
choose the appropriate social situations to engage in humorous discourse. But ultimately I
find it unrealistic to extend this sense of agency to laughter, and I believe that doing so
reflects an overemphasis on a rational, auditing mindset that laughter can be codified into
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a set of stable, useful meanings. Struck with postmodern cynicism, we cannot simply
manufacture laughter to disable the dominant perspective, as these intentions overlook
the difficulty of translating laughter into either the audience’s tacit agreement or active
realization. Likewise, the presence of laughter does not enable us to take a greater sense
of control over the body in order to change to a more appropriate affective regime in
order to resist some sense of emotional hegemony. And to give students such a division,
between appropriate and inappropriate laughter, or authentic and inauthentic affective
capacities, functions to open the door to the pedagogical fantasy that a conscious decision
is possible, and that the rational subject will triumph.
A consideration of humor through Langstraat’s paradigm draws attention to the
inherent dysfunction in applying an audit of meaning to humor. We can historicize
humor. We can discuss the ways that certain jokes work rhetorically to enable certain
ideologies and to displace others. We can build a system of provisional ethics around
comedy, where the humor is finally evaluated for its productive capacities and judged on
whether it enables resistance or docility. But none of these rational approaches could ever
adequately account for laughter, for the body’s spastic upheaval of agency and control.
Humor cannot simply be enrolled into pedagogical service.5 Such an approach would
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It is accordingly no surprise that practicing comedians display significant discomfort with either the
ability to bestow social change on their audience, or to have access to some objective critical distance
through their role as comedians. As both Colbert and O’Brien demonstrated in the previous chapter, some
of the most influential comedians relegate their influence to an accidental fluke of their drive to simply
make the audience laugh. Other influential figures in comedy, such as Bill Maher and George Carlin, have
also sought to avoid the responsibility of influence by claiming that their comedy has resulted in a
formative change for their audience members, but only because those audience members attest to this
change long after the show was over (Dion and Provenza 299, 344).
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violate the very foundation of what makes laughter possible, and the consideration of
humor would be, as with Hogue, the animation of lifeless material.
Again, this is not to say that the project of pointing out the rhetorical
constructedness of ideas and emotions and ideologies should be abandoned. Cultural
studies is a more valuable project than that. My critique is that cultural studies and social
epistemic rhetoric applied to humor would force students to think of the laughing body as
a rational body, which is to say that laughter is a conscious decision that can be made and
changed at will. This definition overlooks the way laughter acts outside the
auditor/reader’s active control, from the unintended outburst to a painful, continuous case
of the giggles. We are laughed more than we laugh. To think otherwise, that laughter is a
controlled, rational process, can be a gratifying pedagogical perspective, as students
would seem to be using humor to actively laugh away the stranglehold of their
ideological construction, but this perspective results in the same cynical production
student-performance as the call to empowerment through comedic self-expression.
The problem lies in the very conception of students as “auditors of meaning,” as it
implies that the goal of understanding the world is, metaphorically, to balance the books.
Students are thus charged with not only developing an understanding of the complex
meanings that circulate around them, but to re-present those meanings to the class or the
teacher in a balanced, rational account of the world. So what happens when, in the course
of the audit, the student laughs at the “inappropriate” jokes, or when the audience
member laughs before the comedian arrives at the punchline? They cook the books! They
point to a clear reason for laughter, even if no such reason exists. They have to, or else
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face charges of being unable to successfully perform their role of auditor, losing
credibility in the eyes of the teacher and their fellow students.
Such is the case with an audit of emotional energy, and especially an audit of
laughter. Students faced with a question of “What does this sadness mean?” or “why did I
laugh at that moment?” would be faced with a tension that exceeds the symbolic, and
thus exceeds their ability to responsibly perform any sensible audit of meaning. If the
classroom is a place where emotions always “mean” and where the will to provide a
sensible audit of meanings is not only enforced through the grading policy, but through
the pressure of even the most provisional ethics, a student faced with an excessive reality
will be forced to efface all records of additional meanings and meaninglessness in order
to be rewarded for their audit.
In light of this inadequacy, I propose that the only substantial arrangement of
pedagogy and humor is one that includes laughter in the audit of meaning as the very
object that cannot productively mean. To this end, I point to a pedagogical system that
provides the space for students to account for the breakdown of meaning. This is not the
only system that can account for laughter in a non-meaningful way, and certainly we
should not take laughter as the only signal that we have reached the limitations of
meaning.

Laughing the Limits of Representation
In order to conceive of a pedagogy that might account for humor without reducing
it to a set of rational, discrete operations, it is important not to frame this turn in
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opposition to the previous pedagogical modes. To begin with this assumption is to expect
the problem of pedagogical power to be solved by yet another pedagogy, and runs the
risk of a new set of classroom standards and practices leading to the same cynical student
performance. Rickert adds that “given the institutional and cultural fetishization of thesis
statements, grades, and grammar, [a complete pedagogical shift] would be nearly
impossible anyway. Instead, we might infuse our own particular pedagogies with this
insight into education’s general culpability, to the extent that we grant students the
possibilities for a writing that would be…their own ‘act’” (165). Likewise, the turn to
humor and pedagogy through non-rational laughter would be infused into the previous
descriptions of comic pedagogy, but as an addition to, not replacement for, concepts like
the rule of three or the comedic voice.
But while teachers would still give assignments to help students develop
continuity in their style or clarity in their word choice, the difference between this form
of pedagogy and the previous three would be that in this classroom the teacher, like many
comedians, would refuse the responsibility for creating any specific student-subject
through humor. I have already established the inherent problems in the teacher’s hope to
create critical student subjects, and how these problems are in many ways an inescapable
function of pedagogy itself. Classroom rituals such as the creation of the syllabus, the
moderation of discussion, the ultimate power to decide a grade, force students to conform
to the teacher’s perspective no matter how much freedom the students would be given.
Diane Davis situates this dilemma as a symptom of the way pedagogical rituals position
the teacher at the center of the classroom as the “subject supposed to know,” which is to
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say that the teacher is supposed to know the correct form(s) of humor, and by extension
the correct form of student-subjectivity that humor produces. (224). Davis’s solution, and
the one achieved through this last pedagogical model, calls for the teacher to perform as
the “subject supposed to know” only as an impostor that cannot actually know (226). As
the students look to the teacher for some authoritative direction to perform, they find that
the teacher’s performance is that of an imposter, lacking a set of steadfast beliefs for the
students to reflect.
This outwardly fraudulent performance, which Davis calls “turning teaching arse
upwards” (226), serves a vital purpose in the way comedians configure their sense of
agency in relation to convulsive laughter, and consequently how comedians so often
refuse to connect their comedic practices to any significant form of social change. When
Colbert states “I don’t accept responsibility because I don’t accept any responsibility for
anything I do.” (Dion and Provenza 26) some might claim that he is being humble about
his success as a social critic, while others might characterize his statement as a cop-out
from any negative perceptions he might inspire. But thinking through Davis’s approach
to pedagogical power, could we not take Colbert’s refusal of responsibility as a genuine
refusal to position himself as a “subject supposed to know”? Surely Colbert’s comedic
perspective has had a significant impact on the American political landscape, but to claim
ownership of that impact, to claim that he can aim his comedy at an idealized form of
social influence, would undermine the impact of the show as something under his control.
Colbert is thus not only unwilling but unable to claim responsibility for inspiring critical
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thoughts in his audience, as any such inspiration had to have been the product of forces
laughter, forces beyond his control.
In a similar way, the teacher in a laughter-infused pedagogy would refuse to
believe in his or her own agency in inspiring the class to laugh. This shift would not rid
the classroom of the pedagogical imperative, no matter how the teacher might perform as
an imposter (“acting the fool” if you will). There would still be ample opportunities for
students to perform their laughter, to laugh at the teacher’s humor in order to improve
their grade. Students would also have the opportunity to resign themselves to an apathetic
perspective, refusing to engage in the classroom performance.
By opening the classroom to the language-play inherent in humor, however, the
students would also inevitably stumble upon some form of humor that exceeds the course
requirements. A student might break into laughter at an incomplete joke, unable to
complete the three part structure with a valid punchline, but still swept into laughter by
his or her own comedic tension. A student might found his or her humor on a set of social
and cultural values incompatible with the rest of the class, sending the individual student
into a fit of laughter that cannot be converted to meet the class standards for clarity. The
teacher would look for these kinds of moments as a kind of generative unproductiveness,
a signal that the students would have not only learned to audit for controlled, productive
meaning, but for the radical excesses of meaning that cannot be returned as a coherent
product for the teacher/auditor to enjoy.
The inherent challenge of this pedagogy would be for both the teacher and the
student to resist the urge to infringe on the excessiveness of these moments. The teacher
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would need to resist the urge to funnel this laughter into a teachable moment, as the
support for a teachable moment on joke construction or social criticism. Like Colbert’s
refusal of responsibility, the teacher would need to allow for the student’s laughter to
function beyond his or her desire to grade it, to make it responsible for anything beyond
its own recognition. Davis explains that this move “does not suggest that the pedagogue
is unqualified or that nothing is happening in the classroom. It only suggests that
something else is happening, an/Other something: it is not, could not be, true
knowledge—universal nor socially constructed—that is being passed here…” (226).
Recognizing laughter in the classroom is recognition of the presence of this other as it
forms at the intersection of pedagogy and humor.
The kind of pedagogical attitude I am after, then, is suitably compatible with the
Linda Bergmann’s attitudes toward humor in “Funny Papers: Initiation and Subversion in
First Year Writing,” which discusses the possibility of writing jokes as a way of helping
students to understand the political underpinnings of academic discourse. Bergmann
begins the essay by referencing the scholarship supporting the role of humor in building
discourse communities, and her hope that by bringing humor into the classroom she
would be able to strengthen the student’s ties to the idea of academic writing as a similar
type of community.
In her classroom, Bergmann assigns what she calls “oppositional discourse,”
which is to say the comedic invention strategies of parody and satire. Some of
Bergmann’s assignments direct this oppositional discourse at the point of literary forms,
such as in her assignment to compose a satirical version of The Oddessy or Dante’s
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Inferno. Other assignments try to bring oppositional discourse to reflect on the lives of
the students themselves, such as assigning the students to write a “sarcastic how-to paper
for next year’s students, based on the survival skills they have picked up in their first
semester at the university” (30). From Bergmann’s perspective, students’ ability to resist
academic discourse in these assignments signals knowledge of how to navigate academic
discourse in a deeper, more intimate way than approaching it as an abstract set of rules to
be uncritically learned and employed. But only a few pages into the essay Bergmann
admits that, upon reflection, she has been forced to revise her hypothesis on humor due to
the fact that “humor is just not that controllable; in their play with words and forms,
students can display a satiric, even subversive edge and at least hint at the possibility of
anarchy…it is the possibility that humor may get out of control that makes it interesting”
(23).
Unlike Hogue or Langstraat, Bergmann situates her role as a teacher as
fundamentally shaped by the flow of humor in the classroom. “I see the ambiguity
(perhaps absurdity) of my own institutional position as ‘permitter,’ ‘director,’ and ‘judge’
of this work.” Bergmann claims, “I run the danger of seeing my hard work in the course
reduced to foolishness…and my students run the risk of so offending me that I will lower
their grades” (31). Indeed, Bergmann’s pedagogy walks the fine line between
intervention and anarchy, to the point where her presence becomes the very tension that
holds students back from the possibility of laughter. To this end, Bergmann’s pedagogy,
insofar as it is represented by her agency as a teacher, does little more than Hogue or
Langstraat’s pedagogical schemes. She cannot detach from the pedagogical fantasy.
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But importantly, Bergmann does not consider the assignments or in class
activities to be the center of knowledge for the students, rather she hopes (and in some
ways fears) that these assignments will lead to a more revolutionary form of humor. “I try
to generate humor in my classes,” she claims “with the anticipation that assigned
oppositional discourse may lead to the unassigned sort” (29). This hope for the
“unassigned sort” of humor is what is so redemptive about Bergmann’s pedagogical
approach, as students are given the opportunity for work that explores the limitations of
the classroom itself. It enables the kind of “risky acts” that Rickert suggests in that it is a
“willingness to give recognition and value to unorthodox, unexpected, or troublesome
work” (Rickert 196). Truly, we cannot say that this line of thinking escapes pedagogical
fantasy, as Bergmann transfers the hope for student obedience to the hope for student
disobedience. However, this kind of classroom environment would provide the space
where a student-auditor, in coming across an excess of meaning, might feel less of a need
to translate that excess into rational discourse.

Conclusion
Regardless of how we might attend to humor along the lines of invention,
pedagogy, and epistemology, we should remember—in line with Burke’s endlessly cited
metaphor of an endless conversation—that we arrive late. Humor is already at work in
the composition classroom, whether or not teachers choose to acknowledge its presence.
At a time when students are as likely to watch CNN as The Daily Show, and more likely
to scroll through a long string of memes than closely examine a professional photograph,
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our students need a more complex understanding of humor. At its most basic level, the
previous discussion has worked to legitimize humor writing as writing, and to establish a
body of pedagogical directions that a humor-based composition class might employ.
By distinguishing these pedagogies via their particular inventive capacities, I have
worked to outline the limitations of initiating the comic through a rational process of
comedic formulas, universal truths, or critical sensibilities. While these limitations are
supported by theories of the inescapable power of ideology, they are also evidenced in
the practices of professional comedians in their consistent refusal to characterize
themselves as pawns of public opinion, representatives of the public good, or the masters
of objective critical consciousness.
The pedagogical turn to laughter, the last of my pedagogical considerations, does
not guarantee freedom from these limitations, at least as far as that freedom represents a
set of objective mental powers which “free” students from their ideological situation. But
what laughter can guarantee is disruption, and in this disruption a glimpse of the
unthinkable, of what might lie just beyond the limitations of our desire for a coherent,
rational relation to reality. This laughter would appear at the micro-levels of resistance
that already take place in the composition classroom, “making classroom practices a
forum for lighting up the thousand tiny resistances that irrepressibly emerge” (Rickert
198). Undoubtedly, there are other ways of accounting for these points of resistance, and
we should not take laughter to be the best signifier of non-meaning in all cases. However,
laughter’s ties to a concrete set of writing practices (via the comedic profession), and
capacity to give unsanctioned visibility to pedagogical insufficiency demonstrates the
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incredible value for humor in the composition classroom. At the very least, my discussion
of humor should deter those who wish to generalize comedy solely as a mechanism for
public detachment.
My discussion also suggests the need for more expansive research into the tension
between the canon of invention and subjectivity, especially with respect to the practical
considerations of composition. Invention, concerned with the origins of discourse, can
easily be made to accommodate the notion of the independent, critical student subject.
This makes it all the more important to consider invention through the sophist’s
definition of kairos, wherein students not only write, but are also written into a complex
network of social and cultural values. Furthermore, we should measure the play of
invention against the other four canons of rhetoric, with regard to both the broad goal of
negotiating classroom power dynamics and the limited scope of comedic practices. Just
as comedians are currently engaged with a number of arguments over the inventive
capacities of comedy, they are equally (and in some ways more directly) invested in
discussions of arrangement, delivery, memory, and style, to the extent that each of these
other canons could potentially lead to a more complex understanding of how comedic
practice could come to bear on composition pedagogy.
While I have attempted to frame laughter as a kind of generative
unproductiveness, I realize that my own discussion is partially belied by the very
investment in rationality that I argue is so problematic. I have delivered the conclusion—
the punchline—so as to release the communicative tension between myself and the
reader, allowing us both to leave this essay under the impression that “I know.” In
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response to this necessary dissonance, I refer once again to E.B. White who, a page after
the dead frog quote, writes “humorous writing, like poetical writing, has an extra content.
It plays, like an active child, close to the big hot fire which is the Truth. And sometimes
the reader feels the heat” (xviii). Perhaps this stimulation via extra-rational heat expresses
the most we can expect out of laughter in the composition classroom, and also the most I
can expect out of my writing here. To this end, I can suppress my own cringe at the
meanings I have made in exchange for the hope that, by this point, my reader has been in
some way “warmed” by a breakdown of meanings; it is the warmth of language in-life.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
How to Add Humor Without Really Trying

Figure A: A chart of words that can be added into serious sentences in order to create
humor found in Anne Jasheway’s “Laughing Matters” (49).
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